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Skew(er)ing Identities: The Assertion of Self in Gish Jen’s Mona in the Promised Land 
and Colson Whitehead’s Sag Harbor 
 
 
Dorothy Mary Alves 
 
 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Identidade, auto-asserção, determinismo hegemónico 
 
RESUMO: Através duma leitura pormenorizada dos textos em epígrafe e à luz da 
história norte-americana de opressão racial, a minha investigação destina-se a 
determinar em que medida Gish Jen e Colson Whitehead se sentem prezos do ‘nós’ 
das suas identidades étnicas, ou se por ventura, as suas obras são posições auto 
assertivos contra o determinismo hegemónico percepcionado de prescrição do papel 
artístico. Fulcral a este trabalho é uma investigação do conceito de identidade e da 
auto multiplicidade. 
 
KEYWORDS: Identity, self-assertion, hegemonic determinism 
 
ABSTRACT: Through a close reading of the above texts and in the light of America’s 
history of racial oppression, my research is aimed at establishing to what extent Gish 
Jen and Colson Whitehead feel bound to the ‘we’ of their ethnic identities; or whether, 
perhaps, their works are self-assertive stances against the perceived hegemonic 
determinism of artistic role prescription. Elemental to this work is an investigation of 
the concept of identity and the multiplicity of self. 
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Introduction 
In approaching this work, my primary focus on self assertion stems from my 
interest in identity and the composite factors which inform that identity. Whilst many 
and varied are the definitions of identity, it is commonly understood to be a term 
which relates to the self and the individual’s awareness of self as independent and 
unique (Louw et. al., 1998; Moshman, 2005). Although identity development is a life-
long process, the profound changes which occur physically, cognitively, socially and 
morally throughout the teenage years provide “the greatest degree of identity 
development” (Louw et. al.,1998:425). These changes are often seen as a threat to the 
adolescent whose childhood self is, in psychological terms, essentially a foreclosed 
identity1 in that his/her identity construct is generally based on the external 
expectations of parents or other significant others. Nonetheless, as the child matures, 
s/he becomes aware of his/her self as independent and the accompanying 
introspection and experimentation with identities that takes place towards a greater 
understanding of that self as a distinct and unique being, is best captured in the 
bildungsroman. Coupled together with my interest in literature, language and the 
written word, I have thus chosen to investigate the theme of identity within this 
literary genre. 
Whilst the bildungsroman provides fertile terrain for a study of this nature, the 
vast landscape of converging racial and ethnic identities and the subsequent struggles 
faced by individuals negotiating this conflux is further found in the ongoing history of 
America and her peoples and offers additional scope for my work on identity. For it is 
within this milieu of elemental difference, and in contrast to the normative ‘white’ 
standard of American identity, that we find individuals of ethnic backgrounds 
                                                          
1
 James Marcia (1980) distinguished between four identity statuses, namely identity foreclosure, 
identity diffusion, identity moratorium and ultimately identity achievement. Identity foreclosure is 
typical in young children but many adolescents’ identity development might be arrested at this stage of 
development in which they never question true personal values but commit to others’ expectations for 
them. Identity diffusion occurs when the individual does not commit to anything and does not attempt 
to develop any commitment. Identity moratorium is typical in adolescence and is a stage of active 
investigation of alternatives. Identity achievement is reached when the individual has developed a 
relatively strong commitment to a set of beliefs or value system. 
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struggling with the additional aspect of a racial/ethnic2 identity in comprehending the 
self. 
I have thus chosen to focus my work on novels written by two American writers 
who might be perceived as carrying the burden of representation, and in using the 
language of social didactics might be labelled as ‘representative’3 of ethnic minorities 
in the larger (white) field of American society and literature. Mona in the Promised 
Land by Gish Jen, and Sag Harbor by Colson Whitehead are written by a Chinese-
American and an African-American respectively. Essentially a bildungsroman, Mona in 
the Promised Land takes the protagonist through to adulthood revealing the outcome 
of years of introspection and self appraisal. Colson Whitehead’s Sag Harbor does not 
demarcate the protagonist’s entire journey through adolescence, nonetheless, his first 
person narrator provides the adult insight necessary for the developmental 
associations of a ‘coming of age’ story. 
Erik Erikson (1968) was the first to provide a framework for the formation of 
identity through the construct of crises in which individuals are lead to define who 
they are, what is important to them, and what direction they want their lives to take. 
This is typically accompanied by a temporary phase of exploration and 
experimentation in which a personal and social identity is developed and this aspect of 
identity status work will be addressed in my work where I analyse this experimental 
phase of the characters’ development. Western society is understanding of the 
adolescent in this psychosocial stage of ‘confusion’ on his/her journey of self discovery 
and makes allowances for those working at developing a sense of self and 
experiencing, what Erikson refers to as, the “psychosocial moratorium”. This is often 
not understood in more traditional cultures, and the trans-cultural scope of these 
works is elemental in my investigation. Erikson’s ultimate view was that adolescent 
                                                          
2 In referring to ethnicity, I use Schermerhorn’s definition of an ethnic group which he defines as “a 
collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry memories of a shared 
historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their 
peoplehood” (Schermerhorn apud Sollors, 1996:xii). I, however, use these words interchangeably, there 
being no significant distinction to be made in their definition, for the purpose of this work. 
 
3
 Referring to works and their artists as ‘representative’ of any given ethnic group is contentious. Yet it is 
a trend which appears difficult to discard and against which artists continue to rebel. For this reason it is 
a word I use both cautiously yet deliberately as I will be exploring the arguments both for and against 
‘representation’, especially with regards to agency and personal identity. 
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exploration of alternatives would ideally result in the individual’s realisation of his/her 
own uniqueness, an experience of continuity across time, a commitment to ideals and 
an understanding of his/her role in society. 
Yet the changes occurring within the individual and their questioning, exploring 
and experimenting do not happen in a vacuum. Interpersonal relationships such as 
with parents and peers, as well as the wider social context play an important role in 
identity development. In societies where a dominant culture sets the standard for all 
aspects of social interaction, the identity of an individual from a contrasting ethnic 
background will necessarily be informed by this disparity. Phinney and Rosenthal 
(1992) claim that the process of identity formation for adolescents from ethnic 
minority groups, 
 
has an added dimension due to their exposure to alternative sources of 
identification, their own ethnic group and the mainstream of dominant culture. 
Growing up in a society where the mainstream culture may differ significantly in 
values and beliefs from their culture of origin, these youth face the task of 
achieving a satisfactory and satisfying integration of ethnic identity into a self-
identity. The ease, or difficulty, with which this task is accomplished depends on 
a number of factors ... In particular, minority adolescents may have to confront 
issues of prejudice and discrimination, structural barriers which limit their 
aspirations and hinder their achievements, and other features of the 
mainstream society that differentiate them from the majority. If minority youth 
are to construct a strong, positive, and stable self-identity, then they must be 
able to incorporate into that sense of self a positively valued ethnic identity 
(Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992:145). 
 
Whilst many have built on Erikson’s theory of identity formation, not the least 
being James Marcia4, and efforts in the fields of psychology and philosophy continue in 
an attempt to redefine the meaning of identity, for the purposes of this work I join the 
ranks of those who propose that identity is an explicit theory of self, because it lies 
beyond the scope of mere behavioural elucidation, but is a theory known to the 
individual (Moshman, 2005). 
 
This is not to deny that a person’s identity is deeply interconnected with a 
variety of implicit assumptions, unconscious dispositions, and socially imposed 
                                                          
4
 See footnote on p.1 
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roles. These assumptions, dispositions, and roles may even be considered part of 
the person’s identity, in a broad, Eriksonian sense of that term. Unless there is 
an explicit theory of self at the core, however, such assumptions, dispositions, 
and roles do not constitute an identity (ibid, p.87). 
 
Thus said, understanding one’s identity as “an explicit theory of oneself as a person 
(original emphasis) is to say it is a theory that construes the self as a rational agent 
(ibidem), with ‘agency’ providing the action and rationality the ‘reason’ for autonomy, 
and true assertion of self. The philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1969) phrases it thus: 
To be a rational agent is to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, 
by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it 
were, from outside. I wish to e somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, not 
being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by 
other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a 
human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing 
them. This is a least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it 
is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world. 
I wish, above all, to be conscious or myself as a thinking, willing, active being, 
bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to 
my own ideas and purposes (Berlin, 1969:131). 
 
Rational agency is particularly important to this study in which, through a close 
reading of the two novels, I will try to show how identity is determined “by a complex 
interaction of inner and outer realities” (Moshman, 2005:102) and in which I hope thus 
to assess whether forces from without, be they prescriptive or interpretative, can be 
perceived to acknowledge individual agency or whether, in fact, they can be construed 
as determinative hegemony. 
Significant to identity development and the individual’s formation of “an 
explicit theory of oneself as a person” (Moshman, 2005: 85) are the various groups to 
which the individual is in some way affiliated and which provide the collective or social 
identities to which individuals belong. Of great importance to the development of Jen 
and Whitehead’s protagonists are not only their ethnic/cultural identities, to which I 
have already intimated, but their identities as family members and members of their 
social and greater societal network. Membership of these collectives is often a source 
of discomfort and unease as the characters struggle with the inner and outer circles of 
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belonging; otherness and even the pretence of otherness, being issues explored by the 
authors. To this end, a closer look at the conceptual notion of collective identity will 
hopefully shed some light on the extent to which group identity either superimposes 
or is subservient to individual identity in the shaping of the characters and the views of 
their respective authors. For whilst “fiction does not mirror reality, it offers a discourse 
by which we construct our versions of reality” (Hutcheon, 1988:40). By addressing 
issues common to the bildungsroman genre Jen and Whitehead are possibly joining 
the ranks of authors who have, to a greater or lesser degree, exposed some sort of 
auto-biographical mindset in tackling issues of identity. They have chosen to tell their 
stories by focusing on protagonists who mirror their respective selves in both ethnicity 
and gender. Perhaps this is merely to aid verisimilitude by way of tapping into a known 
intimate world of experience, or perhaps it is indeed, the portraiture of self veiled 
within the pages of fiction. Nonetheless, “the author’s choice of genre must have some 
bearing on how s/he conceptualizes ethnicity” (Japtok, 2005:21), and through an 
exposé of the text in conjunction with comments by the authors themselves, I hope to 
perhaps uncover authorial self assertion.  
It is important, however, to recognise literature’s space within the realm of art 
and to be aware that the flawed nature of representation, however faithful to reality it 
strives to be will, by virtue of its perceived position within an identity collective, plays a 
role on the demands often placed on artists who are seen as representative of that 
collective. Past claims on black artists have stipulated that “all art is propaganda and 
ever must be” (Du Bois apud Sollors, 1996:103). Whilst the Black Arts Movement in 
America of the 1960s sought to give voice to Black artists and indeed, is widely 
acknowledged to having been instrumental in paving the way for artists of other 
ethnicities, the role assigned artists remains controversial. In contrast to Du Bois’s 
propagandist stance (and there are others), Chappelle’s argument has, perhaps, a 
more modern ring. “Only through complete artistic freedom can any artist discover 
and present his or her own truth” (Chappelle apud Toure 2011:58). In “Skew(er)ing 
Identity: The Assertion of Self in Gish Jen’s Mona in the Promised Land and Colson 
Whitehead’s Sag Harbor” I hope to reveal whether role assignment can be perceived 
as hegemonic determinism and whether through characterization  Jen and Whitehead 
cater to or defy society’s prescriptive roles. 
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 I have organised my work into two main chapters. The first chapter deals with 
the development of both the personal and the collective identity of the individual, and 
the private worlds of Jen and Whitehead’s protagonists are dealt with in the first sub-
chapter. I address three key motives for identity performance in the second section of 
this chapter and have divided this sub-chapter into a further three sub-divisions in 
which I discuss each of these performances. 
Chapter II addresses the individual’s right to assertion in a chapter entitled 
“Dibs: The Supremacy of Definition and Choice”. Here I look at the ways in which the 
respective authors depict the importance of individual definition and personal choice 
in constructing an identity, and I tackle the issues which affect the individual’s 
assertion of self. I begin this chapter by addressing the oft-times unwitting 
performance of those who find themselves acting to someone else’s direction which is 
evident in both books and which I discuss in a sub-chapter entitled “Someone Else’s 
Experiment”. External prescriptive performances often lead to revolt, and I discuss 
rebellion in a second sub-chapter where we witness the characters seeking to loosen 
themselves from the stronghold of authority. In order to assert oneself it is necessary 
to commit to an ideal and I thus look at the differences between involvement and 
commitment in a third sub-chapter. Finally, the assertion of self is enacted through 
staking claim to an identity and I will look at the way the characters, if at all, achieve 
this end. 
 
* * * * * * * 
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Chapter I: Getting Flipped – Identity, Performance and Belonging 
 
Jen’s Mona and Whitehead’s Benji, the protagonists of Mona in the Promised 
Land and Sag Harbor respectively, are in full adolescent swing, trying to deal with life’s 
challenges as best they can, and getting flipped in the process. It is in Jen’s opening 
chapter aptly entitled, “Mona Gets Flipped” that Mona finds herself “sprawling 
through the late afternoon, a flailing confusion of soft human parts such as had no idea 
where the ground was” (MPL, p.21). This sense of groundless existence or at best this 
perceived moving, changeable and unstable reality, provide the backdrop for both of 
these novels. For not only are Mona and Benji getting flipped by peers who are 
themselves looking for answers, but they are getting flipped by life’s experiences. In a 
moment of lax freedom Whitehead’s young adult first person narrator describes how 
he “found nothing more peaceful” (SH, p.64) than floating on his back in the sea: 
 
Letting my body go, as if I didn’t have a body at all and there was no barrier 
between me and the sea, while waiting for one of my friends to flip me over or 
pull me under, because that’s what friends do, but if I could get a few minutes 
alone out of the world I was happy” (ibidem). 
 
Herein rests the symbolism of the volatility of their particular positions – mere novices 
attempting to navigate life’s path yet finding that the road that stretches out before 
them happens to be the same road that “sooner or later skinned [them]” (ibid, p.1). 
 
I.1 Private Worlds: Mona and Benji’s Inner Realities and Emerging Individuality 
 
Central to Mona and Benji’s conception of how best to plot life’s course, is their 
perception of self, and common to both characters is an awareness of their racialized 
bodies. As they try to “identify those potentials that correspond to the ‘true self’” 
(Waterman apud Moshman, 1992:50) typical in adolescent identity work, their ethnic 
minority status forces them to confront issues of difference which might not be readily 
felt but which are nonetheless bestowed on them by the gaze of the other. This is 
evident in an incident in Mona in the Promised Land when Mona is welcomed as a 
newcomer to the Temple Youth Group by a newcomer herself, Eloise Ingle. The irony 
of the situation is that Mona is not a newcomer to the Jewish community and yet 
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Eloise singles her out feeling “less pressed to extend her welcome to anyone else in 
the class” (MPL, p.56). Seeing only her ethnicity, Eloise is oblivious to Mona’s 
newfound identity which leads us to question the elective nature of identity and the 
freedom to claim a new identity status, which I will address later, and what Sollors 
refers to as the “unmeltable” (Sollors, 2006:36) properties of ethnicity. 
“The very emergence of the stress on ethnicity and the unmeltable ethnics was 
directly influenced by the black civil rights movement and strengthened by its 
radicalization in the 1960s ...” (ibidem), and by setting her novel in this era, Jen brings 
to life a period in US history when rising from the “discrediting of traditional 
Americanism” (Gleason, 1983) following the Vietnam War, America faced a racial crisis, 
and by extension an identity crisis, of her own. The ethnic revival that came about is 
that “which has had the most enduring effect on the usage of the term identity” 
(ibidem) and is necessarily relevant to these works under scrutiny. Yet such a focus is 
not without its problems. 
In his study on the manifestation of ethnic traits in a multi-cultural society in 
Beyond Ethnicity – Consent and Descent in American Culture (1986), Sollors outlines 
the debate surrounding ethnicity as a concept. On the one hand it is seen as a natural 
process ‘descending’ or being passed down from generation to generation; and on the 
other hand it is seen as a definitive choice made by individuals or, in other words, an 
affirmation of ‘consent’. Consensual ethnicity and its achieved, self-determinant 
independence cuts to the very heart of American identity where the freedom to self 
expression or assertion is self-evident in the American Dream. Yet when faced with 
physical racial signifiers, the question remains whether “American means being 
whatever you want” (MPL, p.49). 
Erika Lin in her work entitled “Mona on the phone: the performative body and 
racial identity in Mona in the Promised Land” (2003) claims that “Mona’s adolescent 
angst takes the form of anxiety about her body, but what distinguishes this anxiety is 
its intimate relationship to issues of race” (ibid, p.47). The extent to which Mona’s 
adolescent angst is manifest in bodily anxiety is obviously debatable. Nonetheless,  it is 
fair to say, as I have already intimated and as will become further evident throughout 
this study, that her perception of difference most evident in her ethnic physiognomy 
largely dictates the perceptions of others, if not readily her own: 
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Mona tries to imagine what it would be like to forget she’s Chinese, which is 
easy and hard. It is easy because by her lonesome she in fact often does. Out in 
the world of other people, though Mona has people like Miss Feeble to keep the 
subject shiny (ibid, p.32). 
 
Mona’s ability to forget her racialized body is indicative of her assimilation of her wider 
culture. Yet Eloise and Miss Feeble’s contributions imply that America has some way to 
go before accepting her own. 
At the start of Jen’s tale, Mona, her sister Callie and their Chinese immigrant5 
parents have recently moved to the suburbs from a less affluent neighbourhood of 
New York where the girls were regularly confronted with racial prejudice. Their 
parents, Helen and Ralph Chang, have been successful in their business endeavours 
and with their pancake house doing well and another in the pipeline, Scarshill, a 
fictitious suburb of upper middle class comfort and a place that offers schools with a 
“golden student-teacher ratio” (MPL, p.4), is where they have chosen to live. Yet in this 
world of manicured lawns and relative affluence Mona’s life is far from typical, her 
cultural background jarring with that of American suburbia.  
“If [Mona] could, she’d switch everything to be different” (ibid, p.23). As a 
member of the only Chinese-American family in her predominantly white 
neighbourhood she knows she’s different and not only because of her obvious Asian 
appearance. Her friend Barbara is allowed the liberty of choosing what she wants to do 
with her own hard-earned cash, not to mention whether she wants to take up rock-
climbing or any other sport perceived by her mother to be unsuitable for girls, whilst 
Mona has her mother spelling out in no uncertain terms that she did not “sign[] up ... 
for her children to become big-mouthed separate accounting units ...” (ibid, p.48). 
Markus and Kitayama (1991:224) have noted that, 
 
 People in different cultures have strikingly different construals (sic) of the self, of 
others, and of [their] interdependence.... These construals can influence, and in 
many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including 
cognition, emotion, and motivation. Many Asian cultures have distinct 
                                                          
5
 Not made clear in this book, but explained in Jen’s previous novel entitled Typical American, the 
prequel to Mona in the Promised Land, Mona’s parents Ralph and Helen are not, in fact, immigrants to 
America but political refugees. 
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conceptions of individuality that insist on the fundamental relatedness of 
individuals to each other. The emphasis is on attending to others, fitting in, and 
harmonious interdependence with them. American culture neither assumes nor 
values such an overt connectedness among individuals. In contrast, individuals 
seek to maintain their independence from others by attending to the self and by 
discovering and expressing their unique inner attributes. 
 
Thus Mona’s sense of self stems from this double consciousness – the convergence of 
her parents’ culture with the wider American culture. She desperately wants to be able 
to “attend[] to the self” (ibidem) in her own unique way but recognises the 
incongruence of “the Chinese way versus everyone else’s way” (MPL, p.48).  
Such sentiments reveal the distance she feels from her parents’ culture and a 
frustration with this dissimilitude. Unlike other immigrant families where the 
successful suppression of an ethnic identity is often plausible, even if potentially 
tragic6, because of her evident physical difference, Mona does not share this recourse. 
Unable to claim a common identity with her peers, Mona initially accepts the 
“Chinese” label attributed her. She becomes an authority on all things Chinese which 
on the arrival of a new Japanese student to her school extends to the expertise of all 
things Oriental. Her friendship with Sherman Matsumoto offers a forum for an in-
depth look into her ethnic identity and what it means to be an American. Mona’s faith 
in the consensual nature of ethnicity and Sherman’s stereotypical construct of an 
American “that looks like John Wayne” (ibid, p. 14) subtly introduces the reader to 
another of the concepts to be addressed in the book, that of American identity. “Is she 
American?” (ibidem), questions Sherman. Mona’s quick response is “Sure I’m 
American. Everybody who’s born here is American, and also some people who convert 
from what they were before. You could become American ... I could become Jewish, if I 
wanted to. I’d just have to switch, that’s all” (ibidem). Yet the question remains, is 
Mona perceived to be American? 
Despite her confidence in identity sanction and self assertion, she has been 
raised to understand her place in the family as hierarchically insignificant. “Helen is the 
                                                          
6
 “To appreciate the tragic predicament in which some of the sons [of] immigrants found themselves, it 
suffices to point out that the more intensely they despised their ethnic heritage the more conscious they 
were of their ethnic identity. The more ashamed they were of this past, and ever of their parents, the 
more they were aware of their ethnic background. For ... by suppressing ethnicity the sons also rebelled 
against parts of themselves” (Erikson H. Erikson apud Sollors, p.273). 
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mother, and Mona is the daughter which means that Helen knows what is a good idea 
and what isn’t” (MPL:50) in every area of Mona’s life from deciding how to spend her 
free time to choosing what coat to wear. 
Family life in the Chang household is less than perfect. Her parents’ relationship 
is strained on account of Ralph’s mismanagement of the family business. Helen 
becomes involved in the running of the restaurant but remains obtuse, convinced of 
Ralph’s ineptitude at taking care of her – “wasn’t that what a husband was for? (ibid, 
p.46) Mona’s mother had undergone “what amounted to a personality 
transformation” (ibidem), learning to be more assertive, but the rift or “icy split” (MPL, 
p. 47) that runs through their marriage is 
 
blue and wide and deep, and cold enough, Mona’s sure, to freeze a child or two 
to death, though thankfully there are ways of skipping right over it. It’s just a 
matter of watching where you put your feet, and keeping a certain spring to 
your step, and figuring a crack’s a crack (ibidem). 
 
And, most of the time, a spring in her step is what Mona achieves as she brings a 
humorously light-hearted approach to her experiences, despite the constant 
reminders of her fundamental relatedness”7 – “You are Daughter” (ibid, p.45). The 
apparent deficiency of this label along with its demands – “Children are supposed to 
listen to parents” (ibid, p.49), clash with her growing sense of independent self.  
Benji, in Sag Harbor is also confronted with a double consciousness which, on 
the face of it, stems from his minority group status in the larger white American 
society. Like Mona he lives in an affluent neighbourhood of New York and, which in like 
manner happens to be heavily Jewish. Although he is well integrated in his 
predominately white private school, he suffers humiliations which, whilst centring on 
his pubescent awkwardness as much as on racial awareness, draw him in to an early 
confrontation with difference, albeit benign. “I was used to being the only black kid in 
the room” (SH, p.7), he says. Yet noticing the innocuous looks in his direction as bearer 
of the only “yarmulke hovering on [an] Afro” (ibidem) at his friends’ bar mitzvahs 
incites in him the need to want to “sort[] out bona-fide persecution from perceived 
persecution, the this-is-actually-happening from the mere paranoid manifestation” 
                                                          
7
 See Markus and Kitayama on my pp.9-10. 
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(ibid). It would, thus, seem that for Benji too, “comprehending the source of all [his] 
woes ... lay in the strange dualism into which [he] had been born” (Hansen, 1938). 
Whilst Mona’s emerging sense of self comes from her diverging cultural path, 
Benji’s begins with a growing sense of himself as distinctive from his younger brother, 
Reggie, to whom he has always been tied through proximity in age. Although “it was 
nice to have a team” (SH, p.6) severing the ties of twin-hood has brought Benji a 
newfound autonomy through independence from his brother and “it was to that little 
corner of difference that [they] truly aspired” (ibid, p.5). However, in redefining his 
persona, Benji has learnt that following the “Just be yourself” (ibid, p.23) dictum, is not 
the most opportune way to stamp his mark on the world, recognising that by “just 
being myself ... I was just being avoided” (ibid, p.24). Later, in re-examining his youth, 
Benji’s adult self recognises that his “constant state of being” (ibid, p.227) in those 
days was equivalent to the “slight pressure” (ibidem) he experienced from his freshly 
tightened braces. His self-deprecating manner in seeing himself as “the person you 
made out with to make someone pity you” (ibid, p.250) and that his joining the line 
“made it the slow line” (ibidem), fuelled his metaphorical “fear of going off the map” 
(ibid, p.98). “I had the pox on the outside like everyone else, but inside too, where no 
one could see” (ibid, p.227). From where does Benji’s angst arise? 
Like Mona, Benji’s family has been prescriptively influential in forming his ideas. 
He, too, understands his role in the family as secondary to the family as a unit, and he 
is offered no latitude to experiment with modern black iconology, which might give off 
the wrong impression about who they were. “Not that it ever would’ve occurred to me 
to get a gold chain” (ibid, p.87), but the consequences were a given – “My father 
would’ve kicked me out of the house ...” (ibidem). 
The Cooper’s face to the world was modelled on the Cosby family, the 1980s 
sitcom which offered the world a close-up of how a ‘real’ successful black family 
operated. “We were the Cosby Family, good on paper. That was the lingo. Father a 
doctor, mother a lawyer. Three kids, prep-schooled, with clean fingernails and nice 
manners” (ibid, p.160). Yet the reality of family life was something more sinister. Yes 
they were a “made-for-TV family” (ibid, p.173), but sitting in front of the television set 
simply ensured “that they wouldn’t have to talk to one another” (ibidem). 
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Benji knew that what happened in the family was to stay in the family, taking 
great efforts to seal off familial strife by closing windows, literal and figurative, to the 
outside world. He “was wired not to let other people know [their] business. What 
happened in the house stayed in the house, caroming off the walls and furniture and 
us, until it was absorbed or forgotten” (ibid, p. 77). In contrast to the picture-perfect 
Cosby family, his family “knew itself as kicks in the shin and elbows in the stomach” 
(ibid, p.173). Indeed much of Benji’s negative self-worth comes from the latent effects 
of his dysfunctional family. Not even the family meals offer he and his brother a 
chance to engage with their parents, “attention [being] a rare element in [their] 
household” (ibid, p.5-6), and Benji and Reggie are left to the administrations of the 
television set “while [their] parents ate in the living room” (ibid, p.104). 
Benji’s family take their annual holidays at the coastal town of Sag Harbor8 
under the premise that their parents, who work in the city during the week, will join 
them for the weekend. This seldom happens and when it does is fraught with 
innuendos of familial dissention. Benji’s mother, herself a “Sag Harbor Baby” (ibid, 
p.244) having spent her childhood summers in Sag Harbor, is the driving force behind 
this ritual. Says Benji of his mother, 
 
Always this magic happened: as the summer went on, she got younger and 
younger. The sun tanned her skin to a strong, vital brown, and her thin crow’s 
feet disappeared, ushering an impish twinkle in her eyes. ... Out there she was a 
different person. ... Sag Harbor worked on her in a way I’d never seen it do other 
people. There was a part of her that only existed out there (ibid, p.169). 
 
However, in contrast to Mona’s mother who had come to forge a new identity in the 
face of adversity, Benji’s mother is portrayed as losing her sense of identity as her self 
esteem is slowly eroded away by her husband’s obnoxious ways. “This was how my 
mother disappeared” (ibid, p.190), says Benji.  
                                                          
8
 The town of Sag Harbor, a port on Long Island, New York, was traditionally a whaling village but shares 
demographics with The Hamptons, a collection of elite holiday hamlets. African Americans began buying 
holiday homes in Sag Harbor in the early part of the twentieth century. Says Whitehead’s Benji, “That 
first generation claimed and settled on Sag Harbor Bay because the south side was off-limits – the white 
people owned the coastline, South Hampton, Bridgehampton, East Hampton. And the Jersey Shore, and 
every other sandy stretch of vista-full property in the tristate area, the natural places of escape from city 
life. No Negroes, please” (SH, p.51). Despite this, stereotypical thought still believes that there are no 
blacks in Sag Harbor. Says Benji, “Once in a while in the city, I’ll come across a white person, and Sag 
Harbor will come up and they’ll say, “Oh, I didn’t know black people went out there”” (ibid, p.109). 
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Much of Benji’s layered double consciousness comes from his father. Whilst 
cursing “whitey” with one breath and singing along to The Carpenters with the next, 
this man rails against the “Street” as a ‘shade’ of black to be reviled.  
 
The Street in my father’s mind was a vast, abstract plane of black pathology. 
He’d grown up poor, fighting his way home every day off Lenox Avenue, and any 
hint that he hadn’t escaped, that all his suffering had been for naught, kindled 
his temper and his deep fear that aspiration was an illusion and the Street a 
labyrinth without exit, a mess of connecting alleys and avenues always leading 
back into itself” (ibid, p.87). 
 
Benji’s father’s demons of the past play out in the way he confronts the world and in 
his vices. He drinks too heavily which Benji perceives to be the cause of “the chemical 
reaction in his brain that said, Let’s get this hate in gear” (ibid, p.172). As with the 
“parade of shifting masks” (ibid, p.180) on the television, his father fluctuates between 
a past image and current notion of himself. Whilst reneging the Street, he nurtures the 
familiarity of his identity as a ‘dark’ Negro creating an inner circle of ‘dark’ 
compatriots, “She was dark”, he says of one of the old ladies at Sag Harbor, “That’s 
why she was always nice to me ...” (ibid, p.183). He feels at odds with the privileged 
Sag Harbor second-generation types, of which his wife is one, “the light-skinned 
pussies they got out here” (ibid, p.183). 
Many philosophers9 subscribe to the notion that the self is that which is 
contrasted to all else, or essentially the antithesis of ‘other’. Bertens (2003) posits that 
“... our identity is always at least partly defined through what it is not” (l. 3731-32). As 
we will later find in the formation of a group identity, in constructing self the negation 
of ‘other’ is inevitable. Yet in negating ‘other’ significant personal stress is likewise 
inevitable if the designated ‘other’ has formerly been part of one’s composite self-
construct and is now to be divorced from the self. Effectively repressed it will remain a 
constant source of conflict. This is Mr Cooper’s struggle as he attempts to drown his 
self doubt and fear of intangible aspirations. 
He is, however, part of the Sag Harbor set now; if not part of the inner circle of 
Sag Harbor descendants, a part of the larger racial group identity. Rejecting the 
                                                          
9
 Heidegger and Nietzsche are amongst those that propound this notion of self. 
http://asu.academia.edu/RonBroglio/Papers/826043/Heideggers_Shepherd_of_Being_and_Nietzsches_
Satyr 
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“corner nigger” (SH, p.162) stereotype he has opted to share in the Cosby family 
sitcom fantasy (ibid, p.160). His rejection of an identity related to his past reveals the 
elective nature of identity and is what Straub refers to as the “essentially 
retrospective” (Straub, 2001:66) act of identity formation.  
 
Not only reflexive, conscious and preconscious synthetic acts of identity 
formation are retrospective, but also the unconscious process of ‘ego synthesis’ 
emphasized by psychology. The realisation that no one simply has an identity, 
but that identity must be created and maintained in the light of new experiences 
and expectations by means of restructuring, means not least that a person’s 
identity is a construct (ibid). 
 
Benji’s father, “by progressive adjustments ... construct[s] an identity ...” (Henry, 
2001:84) which negates his past. Yet in so doing he remains besieged by feelings of 
inadequacy, perceiving rejection from an inner circle to which he does not belong. 
It is to this figure that can be pinned Benji’s construal of the message “Don’t be 
afraid of getting hit” (SH, p. 136) as “No one can hurt you more than I can” (ibidem), 
and which becomes instrumental in forming Benji’s “laundry list of psychic injuries” 
(ibid, p. 168) and his “premature apprehension of the deep dread-of-existence” (ibid, 
p.5). 
Whilst Mona and Benji face adolescent growth with contrasting battles, their 
status within their respective families is comparably precarious. Benji’s family life is 
almost non-existent whilst Mona’s has become a battleground of will. Through their 
ethnic ties with family, Mona from the vestiges of “Fort Chang” (MPL, p.269) and Benji, 
cut off from the world by his own need to insulate familial strife from the world at 
large, are placed at odds with society. And yet through their societal ties they are 
denigrated by family.  Mona comes to realise that to claim familial group status means 
having to abdicate all other associations and avoid the ravages of adjustment by 
“put[ing] up that brick wall” (MPL, p.23). Both Benji and Mona recognise their family 
units as insular and seek out acceptance in group identity. 
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I.2 Performing Identities 
 
A key image in performance is the masquerade which in and of itself may 
suggest pretence and perhaps even deception. The figure of Sherman Matsumoto, a 
Japanese exchange student who befriends Mona in the first chapter of Mona in the 
Promised Land becomes a central part of the artifice that is played out in Jen’s novel. 
Whilst Mona’s relationship with Sherman is relatively brief, his identity shifts and 
emerges throughout the story as his mask is worn and manipulated by various players. 
I wish to discuss three reasons for performance which are apparent both in this story 
and in Sag Harbor.  
 At a basic level Mona’s friendship with Sherman symbolises a time in her life 
when she had value – the value of symbolic ethnicity which opened the doors to 
acceptance by catering to her peers’ imaginative appetites. Mona engages in a 
performance with Sherman as it offers her a means to belong. To belong to those 
“who have someone to kiss” (MPL, p.5). “You just want to have boyfriend to become 
popular” (MPL, p. 21), accuses Sherman and later Mona understands the truth in these 
words as she desperately tries to make amends in her next encounter with him. Yet in 
this encounter she finds herself unwittingly participating in a series of phone 
conversations with a second Sherman who is actually a disguised Andy Kaplan. Her 
innocent participation continues to aid her need to belong. Belonging, then, is the first 
motive for performance that I will address. There are a further two motives which I will 
be discussing. Firstly, as a means to explore or experiment with an identity, the ideal 
end to which is to provide an encounter with self, and secondly to aid a political 
identity or an identity which has political-type agenda. An example of someone 
performing for a political purpose is found in the character of Seth, the final player to 
manipulate Sherman’s mask. After the break-up of their relationship Seth uses the 
disguise to get close to Mona and to prove his commitment. But many other are the 
players and performances and I return now to the performance of belonging. 
 
I.2.1 Belonging 
 
Accompanying Mona’s newfound sentiments of emerging independent self, 
distinct and seemingly disparate from her cultural/ethnic identity, is an overwhelming 
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desire to belong. Her initial acceptance of an “oriental” identity bestowed on her by 
her peers, offered her acceptance from a novelty aspect, she could “prove that she 
does not need to use deodorant” (MPL, p.6), but provided no sense of true belonging. 
Mona’s friend, Barbara Gugelstein, undergoing her own adolescent journey of self 
discovery has decided to connect with her Jewish roots and thus affects a Jewish 
persona. Mona, then, soon finds herself tagging along to the temple. 
Getting involved in the numerous Youth Group activities at the temple, Mona 
quickly becomes established as the Temple Youth Group “official mascot” (MPL, p.32), 
which, once again, offers her group acceptance but with no real status of belonging. 
Aided by the ministrations of observant others – “Don’t you have a home?” (ibid, 
p.33), she is forced to see herself as a “stranger in a strange land” (ibidem). This 
instigates, for Mona, a succession of talks that she has with the temple Rabbi. In this 
forum she wrestles with issues of identity which she plays out at length with Rabbi 
Horowitz. Assimilation, minority status and its implications, protest and the assertion 
of rights, cultural tradition, and the descent of ethnicity are all thrashed out in Mona’s 
one apparent true space of freedom, the temple – Mona’s perceived Promised Land. 
For here she is free to question, ask and assert. “We can’t just accept everything the 
way they did in China”, she says. “We can’t just go along” (ibid, p.53). The attraction of 
a new Jewish identity soon beckons with the realisation that with it comes the 
freedom to “ask, ask, instead of obey, obey” (ibid, p.34). 
With the evident acceptance of her peers, the Temple Youth Group appears to 
provide Mona with a haven of belonging which is, above all, what she desires. This is 
most evident in Jen’s evocative description of Mona’s inner thoughts. 
 
Mona once went to an exhibit on Chinese portraiture, in which only the faces of 
monks were depicted in all their idiosyncratic detail. Members of society were 
depicted in terms of their activities and their clothes, which was to say their 
rank. For these clothes were not about self-expression; these were closer to 
uniforms. And that was what mattered – not these people’s inner selves, but 
their place in society. At least to the artists who drew them. But what about to 
the subjects? Mona was with a friend that day, who thought that if the people 
portrayed had drawn the pictures, they would have presented themselves very 
differently. Mona wasn’t so sure, though. Mona thought they would have liked 
to be seen in those beautiful gowns and high-status silks. For she understood 
what mattered most to the people in the pictures as if it still mattered most to 
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her: not that the world would know them for themselves – they would never 
dare to dream of any such thing – but that they might know that they belonged 
and where (MPL, pp.122-123). 
 
The assimilation of her Chinese heritage, does not allow Mona the ‘insolence’ to assert 
an identity of her own making, finding her space in the world becoming merely a quest 
to belong. However, when Mona joins the TYG (Temple Youth Group) hotline, despite 
an initial feeling of belonging and discovering that she is “suddenly friends with all 
manner of people” (ibid, p.55), including the “distinctly higher likes of Danielle 
Meyers” (ibidem), she is eventually forced to question whether there is “hidden within 
the circle to which they’ve been admitted, another, smaller circle?” (ibid, p.62). Thus in 
this apparent safe-hold of peer solidarity she comes to realise that group identity does 
not safeguard her against the insecurity of acceptance; acceptance and the feeling of 
belonging, symbolic in the Chinese portraiture, equating to her sense of worth and 
social identity. The assumed threat or incongruity with the group with which she now 
identifies renders her social identity weak, her group identity being ephemerally 
grounded in the collective consensus which is elemental in Assmann’s definition of a 
collective identity: 
 
We understand a collective or We-identity as the image that a collective 
constructs of itself, and with which its members identify. Collective identity is a 
question of identification on the part of the participating individuals. It does not 
exist “in itself”, but only to the extent that certain individuals profess it. It is 
strong or weak insofar as it lives in the thought and action of the group 
members and can motivate their thoughts and actions. (Assmann, 1992:132). 
 
Whilst Baron et.al contend that “[o]ur social identity combines our self-concept and 
the various groupings of people with which we identify” (Baron and Byrne, 1993:174), 
we find that Mona’s chosen social, collective or We-identity becomes threatened by 
her uncertainty of the identity of the ‘other’. For, as previously mentioned, in 
constructing an identity, collective or singular, there is necessarily a deposing of the 
‘other’10. Mona faces the threat of being her group’s inner-circle other. 
                                                          
10
 See my p.14. 
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 Benji in Sag Harbor is faced with a similar threat with the ‘thoughts and actions’ 
(Assmann, op.cit) of his Sag Harbor group rendering his successful inclusion potentially 
precarious. For inclusivity necessarily evokes exclusivity as purported by Friese in his 
definition of a collective identity. 
 
The terms ‘social identity’ or ‘collective identity’ [...] refer to conceptions of 
sameness or similarity with others. [This] sameness within an – imagined – 
‘group’ include[s] a notion of being different from others, from those who don’t 
belong (Friese, 2001:1-2). 
 
Hailing from a white world in which his difference is highlighted in a daily 
confrontation with ‘other’, Benji seeks out acceptance in racial group belonging on his 
annual summer retreat to Sag Harbor. “[I]n mass society” says Glazer “there is the 
need in the individual for some kind of identity – smaller than the State, larger than 
the family, something akin to familistic (sic) allegiance” (apud Sollors, 1996:xvi). Benji 
finds this allegiance with his friends in Sag Harbor. Friendship with fellow African- 
Americans in Sag Harbor, where the black settlement there is steeped in tradition and 
its collective identity is maintained by these traditions, in contrast to his Manhattan 
friendships, allows him to “fit in” (SH, p.5). 
“There was summer and then there was the rest of the time” (ibid, p.4), and 
Sag Harbor spelt out “pure pinned joy” (ibid, p.1). Drawn together by their 
parents’/grandparents’ expressions of conquest and group solidarity in a prejudiced 
world, “The others [the rest of the black community] were necessary” (ibid, p.2), both 
for there to be a summer season of standard fare and to provide Benji with a sense of 
identity, of anchoring him to the planet. 
Summer in Sag Harbor also allows Benji to “dream of reinvention” (ibid, p.23). 
“All over the world the teenage millions searched for routes out of their dank, personal 
labyrinths” (ibid) and Benji’s dream is no different. Yet his reinvention, as Mona has 
also discovered, is conditioned by the other, and in Sag Harbor both the community 
and his friends prescribe the conditions. 
 
We had been doing this for years, making adjustments at the beginning of the 
summer, fine-tuning, to get used to each other again after nine months stuck in 
our different corners of the city. Figuring out the next version of each other. 
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Somebody was coming with the stuff from their neighbourhood, the other guy 
was bringing the stuff from his neighbourhood, and they collided. By the end of 
the summer we were all on the same page” (SH, p.68). 
 
Rejoining his friends in Sag Harbor at the start of summer, Benji’s allocated 
summer-long appraisal of them in lieu of the obligatory “fine-tuning” (ibidem) is 
thwarted by the ease with which his brother, Reggie, has adopted black cultural 
signifiers. On their first day out, Benji notices that Reggie is wearing the same white 
Fila shoes that NP, one of their gang who hails from the Bronx and has the ‘advantage’ 
of ‘truly’ living his black identity, wears. “Hanging out with NP was to start catching up 
on nine months of black slang and other sundry soulful artefacts I’d missed out on in 
my predominately white private school” (ibid, p.29). Reggie, it would appear, has a 
head start. Taken aback by his brother’s inner-circle infiltration, Benji meets the same 
challenges as Jen’s Mona. He is aware that he has to conform to the group code. 
 
Keeping my eyes open, gathering data, more and more facts, because if I had 
enough information I might know how to be. Listening and watching, taking 
notes for something that might one day be a diagram for an invention, a working 
self with moving parts (ibid, p.68) 
 
Benji’s identity construct, in much the same way as Mona’s, becomes coupled with his 
desire to belong, translating into a procedural identity construct prescribed by the 
group. Henry describes this schematic process of identity formation taking into 
account the individual’s unique set of experiences: 
 
By progressive adjustments all individuals construct an identity for themselves ... 
a procedural notion of identity ... performances that have an identifying function 
form a complex of acquired skills, a set of synthetic, communicative and 
reflexive capabilities that allow individuals to unify and endow their own 
experiences with intelligible meanings (Henry, 2001:84) 
 
Yet the much-desired Negro identity is not without its problems. Benji becomes 
aware of two types of ‘black’ – shades, so to speak, that render his understanding of 
the group decidedly problematic. “There were no street niggers in Sag Harbor. ... But 
we all had cousins who ... you know” (SH, p.31). The nuance of a certain level of black 
exclusion confers on Benji another layer of consciousness. The awareness of a clearly 
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defined choice having to be made in respect of identity alignment, even within his 
chosen circle, adds to Benji’s unease as the rigid lines of definition jar with Benji’s 
“taste for nuance” (SH, p.203). 
Thus ownership of this decidedly black identity does not always sit comfortably 
with Benji, there being “pot-holes of double consciousness” (ibid, p.14) with which to 
contend. The gaps in his knowledge of black history as a result of his white-oriented 
schooling, coupled with his father’s sociopathic feelings about race, leave him 
vacillating between “ease and disquiet” (ibid, p.15). “Switch off this, switch on that” 
(ibid, p.30) is how Benji learns to survive – parleying the dividing line of group 
membership, which if looked at from a position of inadequacy, seemed to reveal 
circles within circles concomitant with Mona’s. 
“I wanted to know the origin of Reggie’s behaviour. Why Filas? Who told him 
about using ammonia?” (ibid, p.23). Benji struggles with his brother’s insider 
knowledge of black iconology.  And as he witnesses the new and intricate 
choreography of the in-group handshakes, undermined by his “strong dork 
constitution” (ibid, p.43), he, too, begins to feel that he is on the outside looking in, his 
social outlook having more in common with the stoners’ moral code (ibid, p.123) of 
cool/uncool. “I liked uncool because it meant there was a code that everyone agreed 
on. The rules didn’t change – everything in the universe was either cool or uncool, no 
confusion” (ibidem). “I lost my taste for nuance when I became a teenager” (ibid, 
p.203), confesses Benji. “Nuance got you nowhere. Either/or was where it was at” 
(ibidem). 
Thus left to struggle with ambivalent postures and desperate to hold on to a 
group identity, Benji and his friends subscribe to a performance. They “heard the 
voices of the constant damning chorus that told [them they] lived false, and [they] 
decided to be otherwise” (ibid, p.147). – “We talked one way in school, one way in our 
homes, and another way to each other” (ibidem). And failing to recognise in 
themselves “a minimum continuity and consistency of attitudes, ways of thinking and 
modes of behaviour” (Henry apud Friese, 2001:84), it seems they fail to “achieve 
identity with [themselves]” (ibidem), self assertion eluding them. 
I have shown in this sub-chapter the dynamics of Mona and Benji’s group 
belonging but many are the examples which Jen and Whitehead provide which 
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advocate performance as a means to belong. In Mona in the Promised Land, group 
identity is never more succinct as it is in Jen’s description of Alfred’s group of friends. 
Alfred is Mona’s father’s cook at the pancake house and going on appearances alone, 
his group of friends is anything but composite. “They are Afro-proud and close-
cropped, shiny-faced and gnarled, bearded and clean-shaven – yet there’s a 
relatedness to the way they move ... They’ve grouped themselves so palpably that a 
person could almost touch their brotherhood” (MPL, p.191). On closer inspection, 
however, it appears that they are each, in their own way and in the same manner of 
negation of self peculiar to Benji’s father in Sag Harbor, clinging to this brotherhood at 
the expense of self. 
Professor Estimator “the brain of the group” (ibid, p.197), working his way 
through law school, is spending his summer hanging out with the crew to “stem 
speculation that he’s getting too uppity to run with his people anymore” (ibidem). Big 
Benson and Ray are Vietnam War veterans who have their own war-related hang-ups 
and needs for group solidarity. Luther the Race Man, who has the lightest skin of the 
group, needs to prove how ‘dark’ he is by wearing his identity on his sleeve. He dresses 
in “Afro tricolours”, living to the title of “phenomenon with a theme. As for the theme, 
that goes race, race, race” (ibid, p.198). 
The wearing of masks or, in other words, subscribing to a performance 
becomes a means of buying one’s way in to the exclusive realm of in-group 
membership. On a small scale many are the incidents where the suggestion is that 
‘fitting in’ or staking claim to group membership requires the performance of certain 
identities.  This is evident when Mona, on joining the eighth grade at her new school in 
Scarshill, understands the significance of her performance as the token Asian person as 
giving her ownership of “something [that] people value” (MPL, p. 8) – a symbolic 
performance. Later she wants to be considered ‘cool’ by having a boyfriend. This 
performance reaps its reward when her friendship with Danielle Meyers is reinstated. 
Thus typically, adolescent identity takes root in “solidarity with a group’s 
ideals” (Erikson 1968:208) due to its very nature as a psychosocial stage of human 
development. When Mona falls from grace with Danielle Meyers, her friend Barbara 
steps in to “teach[] Mona to be cool” (ibid, p.58), thus propagating, in true adolescent 
fashion, the supremacy of group ideals and the necessity to conform. 
23 
 
I.2.2 Exploration/Experimentation 
 
Newly affiliated to the Temple Youth Group, Mona’s time is juggled between 
volunteering at the TYG Hotline and stints at her parents’ pancake house. Grotevant 
(1987) speaks of the importance of “two key processes involved in identity formation: 
exploration of alternatives and commitment to choices” (Grotevant apud Moshman, 
2005:94). This exploration necessarily involves performance yet as Mona performs her 
Jewish identity, “she feels more of a Chinese than ever” (MPL, p.66). Brought up in a 
family of “the type to adjust” (ibid, p.4) and having felt the pull of assimilation, self 
assertion remains a remote possibility for Mona as she struggles with Hegelian 
relational issues11. “Is she a proper best friend? A proper sister, a proper daughter, a 
proper student? None of these things” (ibid, pp.109-110). 
It is only in her moment of lovemaking that she truly experiences the selfish 
nature of her humanity, the intrinsic essence of self, and can cast off her cultural over-
voice to appreciate the tailoring of an identity which needs no adjustments. 
 
[S]he finds that she owns a whole self inside the self that she knows, someone 
sharing her skin”. ... She did not realise how wholly she fit the word female, just 
as she did not realize how partly she fit other words. How she’s had to take 
them up, like the clothes in department stores. ... all that matters is how they’ll 
fit after she fixes them. ...  Between her and other people there has always been 
a moat of explaining, work and explaining, until now (ibidem).  
 
It is the relational aspect of her identity, which has kept Mona from discovering the 
essence of who she is. By losing herself to the experience of lovemaking she connects 
with this person, the essence of her-‘self’, for the first time. Yet Mona is still some 
distance from claiming this self. 
Barbara, her best friend, and Seth, her soon-to-be boyfriend (who before going 
off to college wishes to establish whether college is a “socializing force to which he can 
submit” (MPL, p.62)), also help at the hotline. Seth, it transpires, is on a mission to 
break away from “the small-minded bourgeois thinking of his father” (ibid, p.63). “Mr 
Authentic Self” (ibid, p.121), as Mona comes to refer to him, claims to live by the 
                                                          
11
 The premise of Hegelian thought is that the self is more truly determined by an intrinsic essence 
rather through the dependence on a relation to other things. 
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adage that “between the inside person and the outside person there should be no 
difference” (ibidem). Thus, for the large part he has disposed of manners in favour of 
the hard truth. 
Yet Mona deduces that Seth’s persona is a performance of sorts as she 
discovers that his desire for authenticity comes at the expense of true introspection. 
He fills his head with the theories of philosophers and other great thinkers at the 
expense of self knowledge and Mona comes to believe that his anti-establishment 
ways have more to do with the resentment of an over-bearing step-mother “who 
assigns her guests chores like cleaning up their own bathroom” (ibid, p.121), than true 
commitment to an identity. Seth, nonetheless, reveals himself to be Grotevant’s classic 
explorer12 as he experiments with an identity of his choosing. However, Mona “not 
interested in being a phenomenon” (MPL, p.64), is wary of his advances seeing in them 
a “feeble excuse for a love affair” (ibidem) and surmising his goal to be simply to make 
of her “a world-spanner! – a regular Yoko Ono” (ibid, p.63). This bears much relevance 
to my later discussion on performing to someone else’s expectations, which I will 
address in Chapter II. 
Mona and Seth, in time, develop an intimate relationship which proceeds from 
the re-enactment of an attack scene in which Seth comes to Mona’s rescue. The 
significance of this scene as a self-assertive act will receive further attention later in 
this discussion. Mona, Seth and Barbara who “more than ever too, ... seems to be 
considering who she is, picking out her personality” (ibid, p.127) thus continue in their 
exploration of identity.  
Mona finds herself testing her new Jewish identity and decides to put her 
Jewish social awareness and charity into action. Following a discussion about race and 
identity where the friends establish that “it’s generally an advantage to look more like 
Archie Bunker than like Malcolm X” (ibid, p.140) she condescends to offer Alfred, 
recently evicted from his girlfriend’s house, a place to stay at Barbara’s house whilst 
her parents are away. The stage is set for what will become a true experiment in 
ideals. The question remains to be asked, however, as to whose ideals and at whose 
expense? 
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 See my p.23 
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Characteristically, many of Mona and Benji’s friends and peers struggle with 
their individual identity issues and to a greater or lesser degree seek out acceptance or 
try to find themselves through exploration of different identities and through a 
performance. Before addressing Whitehead’s treatment of this aspect of performance, 
I wish first to turn my attention to Mona’s sister, Callie. 
The full cycle of Grotevant’s identity status work is depicted in the figure of 
Callie, who at the start of the novel declares that she is “sick of being Chinese” (ibid, 
p.29). Her rejection of a foreclosed identity model13 stems from her feelings of 
inadequacy and confrontation with ‘the other’ but which, in contrast to Mona’s 
acceptance-driven assimilation, has left her on the outside. Also, and in a similar way 
to Whitehead’s Benji whose childhood was one of emotional neglect, Callie “grew up 
by night” (ibid, p.253) in the sense that she was her mother Helen’s least favoured 
child. 
Membership of the family collective and indeed acceptance has for her, as for 
Mona, entailed conforming to a prescriptive filial code and its associative sense of the 
abdication of self to the will of her parents. “For example, if one of [the girls] gets their 
father a bowl of rice before he asks for it, everyone approves. She knows her father’s 
mind, say the parents. But if they know their own minds instead, watch out” (ibid, 
p.29). With this backdrop of suppressed individualism, her degree of contempt for her 
ethnic roots appears warranted, which makes for her conversion to an ‘authentic’ 
Chinese identity seem all the more radical and improbable. 
Callie has gone away to college where she has befriended an African-American 
girl called Naomi. Under Naomi’s tutelage, Callie learns that she can choose her own 
ancestors, of which her parents need not be a part. Perhaps guided by a perception of 
the “unmeltable” descent qualities of ethnicity14 or perhaps simply as a means of 
gaining the acceptance of a welcoming in-group who, as members of the “coloured” 
community (Mona is surprised to hear that she is “yellow” given that she is “not 
exactly a text book primary” (Ibid, p.170)), seem “involuntarily stuck to one another by 
a special invisible but all-weather glue” (ibidem) Callie explores this new identity. 
“Consent and descent may not only be embodied by different characters”, says Sollors, 
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 See footnote on p.1. 
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 See my p.8. 
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“but may also be at odds with each other in one personality. Many ethnic writers have 
sketched the divided interiors of ethnic rooms. But what interior is more fascinating 
than the inside of a divided self?” (Sollors,1986:168). I will return to other aspects of 
Callie’s performance in my final chapter but significant to note here is that in light of 
her initial denunciation of her ethnicity, Callie’s acceptance and to a large extent 
creation of a new ethnic identity ties her not only to the descent concept of ethnicity, 
but to the consensual camp of Sollors’ debate.  
Conversely, Benji’s friend Bobby in Sag Harbor, takes defiant strides to negate 
his upbringing by experimenting with a militant persona. Whitehead’s adult narrator 
reflects, 
 
 “Black boys with beach houses. It could mess with your head sometimes, if you 
were the susceptible sort. And if it messed with your head, got under your 
brown skin, there were some typical and well-know remedies. ... [T]he most 
popular brands were Militant or Street, Militant being the opposite of bourgie 
capitulation to The Man, and Street being the antidote to Upper Middle Class 
emasculation”. (SH, p.58). 
 
Bobby, like Benji’s father, models a ‘We-identity’15 on the ‘other’, this being on a 
perceived negative which he deliberately chooses to exclude from his collective 
identity. Yet the danger lies in the fact that “constructions of identity are the more 
compact as well as potentially aggressive the more they erect boundaries against the 
imagined outside” (Friese, 2001:12). This is seen in social theory where Insider doctrine 
attempts to turn the tide of racial stigma: 
 
What the Insider doctrine of the most militant blacks proposes on the level of 
social structure is to adopt the salience of racial identity in every sort of role and 
situation, a pattern so long imposed upon the American Negro, and to make that 
identity a total commitment issuing from within the group rather than one 
imposed upon it from without. By thus affirming the universal saliency of race as 
an abiding source of pride rather than stigma, the Insider doctrine in effect 
models itself after doctrine long maintained by white racists (Merton, 1972). 
 
Bobby’s militancy whilst affirming group solidarity, is founded on the negation of self 
stemming from his pampered upbringing, and the performance of which can takes its 
                                                          
15
 See reference to Assmann on my page 18. 
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toll by turning into self-hatred, a side-effect present in Benji’s father. Bobby “rebelled 
against his genes, the Caucasian DNA in his veins square-dancing in there with strong 
African DNA” (SH, p.59) and it was his successful mother who “bore the brunt of his 
misguided rage” (ibidem).  
Although offering Bobby a sense of belonging, Bobby’s identity anchored within 
insider doctrine becomes restrictively prescriptive and potentially aggressive – his “real 
lookin’ gun allowed him to indulge his hard-rock fantasies and bury his deep prep-
school weakness. Hide his grandfather’s soft features in the scowl of a thug, the thug 
of his inverted Westchester fantasies. A kind of blackface” (ibid, p.126). Thus 
disturbingly, “A strong – and inclusive – sense of belonging to one group can in many 
ways carry with it the perception of distance and divergence from other groups. 
Within-group solidarity can help feed between-group discord” (Sen, 2006:p.1), says 
Sen and we find the boys jealously staking claim to the waterfront – “any infiltration 
had to be checked out” (SH, p.34) and thwarted. 
The wearing of masks in group dynamics becomes, essentially, a theme in its 
own right as individuals in both these novels struggle to retain group membership. In 
the same way that Bobby prescribes to insider doctrine and also due to the perceived 
in-group prejudice against his lighter skin, Luther one of Arthur’s friends in Mona in the 
Promised Land, fights his personal battle against any such negative associations. He 
does this by attending rallies which pump up his ‘blackness’, “always [having] to be out 
protesting and organizing to prove how much blacker he was than you” (MPL, p.142). 
The constant recourse of those who lie on the borders of an ‘in-group’ to buff their 
‘We-ness’ to the detriment of the other is addressed by Anne Anlin Cheng in her study 
of race and identity in The Melancholy of Race: Psychoanalysis, Assimilation, and 
Hidden Grief. In this work she states that there is a “fundamental paradox” (Cheng: 
2001:411) in relying on such a limited view of identity for “identity is the very ground 
upon which [both] progress and discrimination are made” (Cheng: 2001:411). Yet, she 
claims that due to the subjective nature of perception such uni-focal identity 
constructs contain the power of bigotry. Benji’s response to the benign act of partying, 
illustrates the power of bigotry as it does the subjective nature of perception. 
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Half the fun of having a party, it seemed, – and I speak as someone who was not 
invited to parties, and thus had an outsider’s perspective – was in excluding 
people, especially your neighbours, who would be forced to listen to the music 
and laughter, closing their windows to keep noise out as some closed windows 
to keep noise in (SH, p.80). 
 
The propagation of in-group and, in Luther and Bobby’s case racial sentiments, whilst 
arguably nurturing an environment of acceptance for those within its boundaries, 
foments the constant striving for that acceptance and can set individuals at odds with 
society. “Harping on difference brings trouble” (MPL, p.222), says Barbara’s mother 
and this is expressed in Whitehead’s novel too. In Sag Harbor, the narrator tells of “the 
selfish tug of ownership when they saw strangers – ie. white people” (ibid, p.35-36) 
and concludes “Get a bunch of kids together who felt punked out in various ways and 
the collective mind sought ways to punk out others” (ibidem). For as Sollors quite 
rightly perceives, “If we construct an identity without ethnicity (in the sense of 
historical continuity ...) we may feel ‘dead’ but if we define ourselves exclusively in 
ethnic terms we are equally in trouble” (Sollors, 1996:xx). Both Sen and Cheng claim 
that outer-group other-ing from the confines of the prescriptive in-group fuel 
miscreant behaviour, yet other-ing from the outer group equally foments hostility. 
‘We-identity’ adherence is further shown to strip away individual identity. 
Following the disappearance of a silver flask from Barbara’s house in Mona in the 
Promised Land, where an accusation is levelled at Alfred’s friends, the Estimator who 
has previously conducted himself as an independent thinker, turns face. Suspected of 
“stealing along with my black brothers” (MPL, p.205) he discards his role of 
“distinguished thinker” (ibidem) by retaliating with the performance of the 
“Representative Black Man” (ibidem). The history of common experience prescribes 
group support and anything less becomes evidence of negating group solidarity. 
The above incidents show that both the groups with which one identifies (in-
groups) and those of the other (out-groups), through their use of stereo-type tend to 
strip one of the freedom to be self assertive. In separating herself from her family, 
Mona, too, is perceived to be rejecting them. For “to embrace what [they] embraced 
was to love; and to embrace something else was to betray” (Jen, 1986). How then to 
avoid the “catch-22” (MPL, p.184)? “The stereotype stuff was hard, no joke, no matter 
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where you came from” (SH, p.88), says Benji, for although the assumption is that we 
have a variety of flavours at our disposal in the ice cream parlour of life, “[t]he 
freedom of choosing our identities in the eyes of others can be extraordinarily limited” 
(Sen, 2006:31). 
 This is represented in Benji’s narrative of the racial code of his black community 
to which they were obliged to adhere: 
  
You didn’t, for example, walk down Main Street with a water-melon under your 
arm. Even if you had a pretty good reason. Like, you were going to a potluck and 
each person had to bring an item and your item just happened to be a 
watermelon, luck of the draw, and you wrote this on a sign so everyone would 
understand the context, and as you walked down Main Street you held the sign 
in one hand and the explained watermelon in the other, all casual, perhaps 
nodding between the watermelon and the sign for extra emphasis if you made 
eye contact. This would not happen. We were on display. You’d add cover 
purchases, as if you were buying haemorrhoid cream or something, throw some 
apples into the basket, a carton of milk, butter, some fucking saltines, and all 
smiles at the register (p.88). 
 
I will address the performance of roles directed by someone else and for which one 
has not auditioned in Chapter II. However, I now wish to discuss my third and final 
motivation for performance. 
 
I.2.3 Political Performance 
 
 At the beginning of Whitehead’s novel, Benji’s adult narrator describes his life 
as a string of bar mitzvah attendances as, in fact, many of his fellow classmates are 
Jewish. But there was one girl, Liza Finkelstein, whose parents denied her this 
traditional Jewish rite of passage. The narrator says that the Finkelsteins “respected all 
races, colors, and creeds, unless that creed was their own” (SH, p.7), and later 
continues: 
 
Mr Finkelstein always seemed glad to have me around. Sending their daughter 
to a fancy private school was a betrayal of core values, paying tuition when you 
were supposed to support local public schools being in traitorous equivalence 
with eating grapes when you were supposed to boycott grapes. Those days, 
every nonunionized grape was a tear squeezed out of the eye of a migrant 
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worker’s child ... The fact that Mr Finkelstein’s daughter had a bona fide black 
friend mitigated the situation a bit (ibid, p.8). 
 
Whilst the observations of Whitehead’s narrator highlight Cheng’s paradox of progress 
and discrimination in a subversive way16, more importantly the perception of the 
Finkelstein’s identity alignment cannot be divorced from their political stance. Says 
Gans (1979), “Symbolic Ethnicity [...] takes political forms”. Whitehead’s tongue-in-
cheek portrayal of the Finkelstein’s self-admonition of their own creed highlights the 
fact that whilst their sentiments might be genuine, their performance, ties their 
identities to the symbolic. And in a similar way, Seth’s experimentation with anti-
establishment behaviour in Mona in the Promised Land and Bobby’s foray with guns in 
Sag Harbor are also experimental. The statements thus made become forever tied to 
their “symbolically and socio-culturally mediated, meaning-structured and meaning-
creating actions” (Straub apud Friese 2001:67). 
 Naomi, Callie’s college friend is a prime example of someone who has 
constructed her identity on the symbolic. She has adopted as ancestors prominent civil 
rights activists such as Harriet Tubman and Sojourner Truth as well as less political 
figures but, nonetheless key cultural figures, such as the African American musician, 
Roberta Flack. Espousing a consensual ethnicity from which she borrows cultural 
symbolism serves her political voice and provides her with a sense of historical 
continuity (descent). Thus she also accepts her ethnicity as a “construct evocative of 
blood, nature and descent” (Sollors, 1986:151). 
 Yet she does not define herself exclusively in these terms merely borrowing 
from the symbols of her black cultural heritage as befits her political purpose. Indeed, 
says Gans, “Symbolic ethnicity does not need a practiced culture, even if the symbols 
are borrowed from it ... Symbolic culture is as much culture as practiced culture, but 
the latter persists only to supply symbols to the former” (Gans, 1979). Naomi takes 
equal liberty in borrowing Chinese symbolism – “She chants, and drinks tea, and makes 
kites” (MPL, p.169). By asserting a decidedly foreign self, she takes a political stance, 
rejecting cultural homogenization and negating the directive to melt, unaccounted for, 
into the American social pot. She enjoys “scrabble, film noir, stargazing, soccer” 
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 See my p.27 
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(ibidem). “She is in short, a statistical outlier” (ibidem) and whilst also an 
“overcompensator” (ibidem), it is this quality which redeems her from the foreclosure 
of being a mere political entity. Her inner-descent self is married to the outer-consent 
being, making of her a true “Renaissance woman” (ibidem). 
 Yet political performance can signify a performance for personal gain. Hailing 
from a culture where familial allegiance is esteemed, Mona’s parents willingly, if 
unwittingly, participate in the identity performance of their head chef, Cedric. Cedric is 
depicted as a master of deception, masking his performance with true symbolic 
ethnicity. He aligns himself with Ralph and Helen, even claiming inter-marital ties with 
Ralph’s family in China. Tellingly, “his pronunciation got noticeably better after he got 
his green card” (MPL, p.86) and the two children, wife and parents that he has left 
back in China all become part of the facade. Also, perhaps, unwittingly Mona provides 
him with the cultural and historical symbolism to be able to work on Ralph and Helen’s 
sensibilities, “describ[ing] to him the goriest, grossest things and ask[ing] him if the 
Red Guards would do that” (ibid, p.86). This has stood him in good stead as Helen and 
Ralph “know who he is” (ibid, p.118) and can thus bestow on him alone the privilege of 
trust, an appreciation of which Mona deduces has more to do with racist tendencies. 
As Helen and Ralph play to Cedric’s direction, the curtains open on the prescriptions 
and restrictions of being involved in someone else’s experiment. 
 
* * * * * * * 
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Chapter II: Dibs – The Supremacy of Definition and Choice 
 
II.1 Someone Else’s Experiment 
 
Being a part of someone else’s experiment, and specifically one’s parents’ 
experiment, is something against which most of the teenagers in both Mona in the 
Promised Land and Sag Harbor rebel. In Sag Harbor Liza Finkelstein, a school friend of 
Benji’s who I mentioned in the previous chapter, and for whom pride in her parents’ 
social action was a significant part of her identity, eventually comes to reject this 
foreclosed identity by turning her pride into derision. Her scornful testimony to her 
parents’ March on Washington in the 1960s affords her the distinction of self-
assertiveness. “She was a teenager in that moment” (SH, p.8). 
Similarly, Mona’s friend Barbara in Mona in the Promised Land defies her 
mother’s attempts to steer her away from an excess of Jewish sentiment. That Barbara 
eventually aligns herself with her mother’s beliefs, does not attest to a foreclosed 
identity, but rather to the successful achievement of an identity in the wake of her 
exploration of other avenues. The narrator affirms that Barbara develops into a self-
assured individual who is “unfazed by discount clothes stores where everybody shares 
one big dressing room” (MPL, p.196). Not to be felt by her are the sentiments of 
prudish timidity of an unchallenged identity. “For she is who she is, as she’ll tell you; 
she never pretended to be a size two” (ibidem). 
Yet what allows her to assert herself in this way is the relative latitude she is 
granted to find her own path. Seth’s mother, Bea, understands the importance of this 
more than anyone. “It’s how he’s becoming his own person ...” (ibid, p.258), she says 
of Seth’s experiments. But for Mona and Benji the struggle to break out of the confines 
of someone else’s experiment proves more of a challenge. Yet, ironically, they too 
enlist the performance of others who play a part in their experiments. 
I mentioned in my last chapter (my p.24) that with the arrival of Albert the cook 
at Barbara’s house, the scene was set for an experiment of sorts, but that what was 
elemental to the perspectives of the individuals involved was the agency of that 
experiment; for as the dynamics at Camp Gugelstein (as Barbara’s house comes to be 
called) alter, each character struggles with feelings of subjection to someone else’s 
experiment. 
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Alfred’s instalment at Barbara’s is essentially Mona’s experiment in social 
action. Concerned with Alfred’s personal problems and aware that his social status 
offers him fewer chances in life, she attempts to turn her concerns into action as 
determined by her new Jewish faith and in counter-position to what her parents would 
do. For them, anything reaching beyond the extent of familial allegiances is considered 
to be none of their concern. Thus Alfred becomes Mona’s cause and by extension 
Barbara’s cause too. At Barbara’s house all Alfred’s immediate needs are met. Apart 
from the requisite roof over his head, he has at his disposal all the privileges of a home 
in the suburbs. Nonetheless, he begins to feel imprisoned unable to shake off the 
feeling that he is being kept by ‘the white man’ – At Barbara’s house he has to play by 
Barbara’s rules or leave. 
 Eventually Alfred does resist the stricture of life under Barbara’s terms and, 
after accidentally meeting and subsequently getting involved with Barbara’s cousin 
Evie, he establishes himself comfortably into the home, soon inviting his friends 
around to help him pass the time. When Barbara and Mona discover Alfred’s deceit 
Mona is the first to understand his motives. “You didn’t want to be in someone else’s 
experiment” (MPL, p.194), she says to Alfred. “It was your experiment instead of ours” 
(ibidem). 
 Alfred has, effectively, turned the tables on Barbara and Mona’s charitable 
cause. His promotion from “pet” (MPL, p.195) status and the inclusion of his friends at 
Camp Gugelstein soon provide a different flavour for the social proceedings with what 
was originally Barbara and Mona’s cause, and more recently Alfred’s emancipation, 
turning into Seth’s experiment on radicalization and anti-bourgeois living. 
 In a parallel situation Mona, too, “begins life as a cause” (MPL, p.173) when she 
finds herself in Eloise Ingle’s experiment. For a week or two in summer, Mona visits her 
sister at a seaside resort in Rhode Island where Callie has a summer job. Here Mona 
bumps into her classmate Eloise, who with her family is holidaying there, and Eloise 
condescends to Mona’s plight as member of a ‘fated minority’. She thus seeks “to find 
diversions for Mona, to brighten up her cheerless little life” (MPL, pp.173-174). Mona’s 
unwitting acceptance of her role as “statement” (MPL, p.175) encourages her to 
quickly forget “what it was that she didn’t like about Eloise back at temple” (MPL, 
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p.176). Through their participation in someone else’s experiment, both Mona and 
Alfred are effectively robbed of the performance of their own volition. 
 It is only back at Barbara’s house when Camp Gugelstein falls apart, that Mona 
recognises her performance as being to someone else’s direction. She sees that “[her] 
experiment has turned into [Seth’s] experiment” (MPL, p.223), the recognition of 
which soon leads to their break up. “All you wanted was for me to be a radical” (Ibid, 
p.222), she tells Seth. Experimenting with Judaism and its charitable causes was 
Mona’s attempt to “determin[e] who [she] is and ... deciding who [she] will be” 
(Moshman, 2005:75). Yet in exploring her alternatives and experimenting with 
different notions of herself, she inadvertently finds herself propositioned for Seth’s 
experiment on radicalization. “He really thought her more radical than she realized, a 
kind of Jewish Yoko Ono. But how convenient of him to believe that” (ibidem). By 
pigeon-holing Mona, she serves his purpose. 
 Slowly Mona realises that this has been the problem from the start. All along, 
through her various performances, “[s]he was trying to find herself” (ibid, p.220), only 
to discover that she has been playing roles for which she didn’t audition. She tries to 
explain this to her mother but is met with the response that “[d]aughter’s job is to 
listen, not to tell mother her big-shot opinion” (ibid, p.221). 
 In Sag Harbor, we find in the figure of Benji’s uncle someone who, in a similar 
way to Mona, struggles with assigned prescriptive behaviour. Benji and his friend, 
Bobby, cross paths with Uncle Nelson one afternoon and offer him a ride. In looking 
back at the incident, the adult Benji is able to recognise Uncle Nelson’s resistance to a 
paradigm “in line with the standard Sag Harbor alignment” (SH, p.205) which had 
condemned him to a lifetime of exclusion and strained family ties. For it was all about 
the “extension of the brand” (ibid, p.208), the narrator reflects, and aligning yourself 
with the “founding fathers ... and their ideas of how proper black people should act” 
(ibid, p.221), following in the footsteps of “people like [Benji’s] grandfather working 
hard to make something for his family, and passing it down to [the next] generation” 
(ibid, p.200). Uncle Nelson rebels against the stereotype. 
In a descriptively discerning yet critical rendition of mankind and his foibles, the 
adult Benji places a spotlight on the hegemony of stereotypical thought as a sort of lip-
service to someone else’s experiment and the perception of freedom of choice. He 
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describes the ice-cream parlour where he worked over the summer depicting it as the 
great social equalizer and debunker of stereotypes. From every walk of life “they came 
through the doors of Jonni Waffle like all the rest, like all of us” (SH, p. 113). His critical 
appraisal of social difference takes the form of a stark portrayal of every possible 
variant of white-holiday maker from the “tasselled loafer” (ibid, p. 109) wearers, to 
“weekend hoboes (ibid, p. 113), to the “creatures of such affluence that I cannot even 
speculate about their day-to-day” (ibid). However, “We didn’t discriminate, we 
scooped. For the burnouts, the flotsam, the human tumbleweeds who were all of us 
but for our choices” (ibid, p.111). 
In a subversive way Whitehead, whilst lifting the lid on the stereotypical model, 
appears to be endorsing the plurality of identity through his acknowledgement of the 
plurality of race. In referring to our common humanity whilst at the same time 
conceding individual difference within a group from which he is vetoed by virtue of his 
ethnicity, he shows how “counter-hegemony functions ... on the same terrain [but] 
differently” (Layoun apud Japtok, 2005:25). The statement he makes appears to be 
that “man’s functionally relevant dissimilarity from all others is what makes him 
human: similar to others precisely through his high degree of differentiation” 
(Devereux, 1975). 
This fundamental belief that culture/race and ultimately identity cannot be 
confined into “stark and separated boxes” (Sen, 2006:103) is supported by many who 
propose that generalizations or stereotyping “present astonishingly limited and bleak 
understandings of the characteristics of the human being involved (ibidem). The Post-
Black aesthetic prompted by Thelma Golden17 and others who sought to broaden the 
definition of “black art” is just such an example of resistance to social, cultural and 
racial pigeon-holing. Touré, a supporter of the Post-Black perspective, in his book 
entitled Who’s Afraid of Post-Blackness also rejects the narrow description or single 
notion of blackness to which many supporters of ‘ethnic pride’, or as he refers to it 
                                                          
17
 Thelma Golden, the Curator at the Studio Museum in Harlem, first coined the term Post-Black to 
describe a movement in contemporary art. In the catalogue for the 2001 Freestyle Exhibition she says 
that Post-black artists are “adamant about not being labelled as black artists” but that their work entails 
“redefining complex notions of blackness”. Says Taylor, “Having been born, for the most part, after the 
1950-60’s civil rights movement, these artists experience race differently from their predecessors ... 
[and] balk at the traditional meanings and burdens of Black Art and The Black Artist; but he or she has 
also learned to play on and with these meanings” (Taylor:2007:626). 
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“racial fundamentalism” (Touré, 2011:154) subscribe. Such a departure is not to deny 
that who we are is very much tied up with our origins or cultural heritage and can, 
indeed, be a source of comfort. Group membership is important to the healthy 
existence of humanity, for it is in bonding with people similar to ourselves that we 
forge meaningful relationships. Yet even though our cultural background “can 
influence our sense of identity and our perception of affiliation with groups of which 
we see ourselves as members” (Sen, 2006:112) the extent to which ethnic allegiance is 
felt can only be determined by individual experience and is fundamentally unique to 
the individual. Further similarity is not restricted to these groups and as adult Benji 
affirms you eventually gather people around you because “there’s affinity, stuff you 
share in common and things you seek out in other people” (SH, p.263), not limited to 
these racial boundaries. 
The focus of Benji’s appraisal of the “human tumbleweed” (SH, p.86) that 
walked through the doors of the ice cream parlour is that we are all alike and it is our 
choices that differentiate us from each other. The primacy of choice, then, becomes 
elemental. Yet the “freedom served as you like it” (ibidem), whilst advocating a 
consensual view of identity, takes on the derisive tones of scepticism for the question 
begs to be asked whether this choice is real or pre-ordained – mapped out on faces as 
on those of the marauding crowd at the ice-cream parlour whose “inner was written 
on the outer” (SH, p.100). “Stuck”, like Benji, “whether we wanted to admit it or not” 
(ibid, p.88). 
“You got to know what people were going to order as soon as they walked in 
the door” (ibidem), says Benji suggesting that often choice is a pretence. Thus the 
“show of considering other flavours” (ibidem) becomes mere spectacle – a 
performance for someone else’s benefit. “What was the point?” reflects Benji. “Move. 
Don’t move. Act. Don’t act. The results were the same. This was my labyrinth” (ibid, 
p.106). 
 Young Benji also struggles with prescriptive behavioural standards advocated 
by his parents. On a practical and judicious level, Benji recognises the wisdom in his 
mother’s warning to be wary of the treacherous ocean currents – “[it] wasn’t such a 
bad philosophy, really, applicable to most situations in a metaphorical sense but”, he 
contends that he “hated being so conditioned” (ibid, p.55) It is this express desire to 
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exert an influence on his own life and be the determiner of his own fate which reveals 
the assertion of self concomitant with Moshmann and Kallen’s definition of adolescent 
identity as experimental and volitional. Yet as Benji attempts to step out of the 
shadows of parental governance he is also confronted with restrictions from his peers. 
 His desire to change his name to Ben is thwarted time and time again by his 
peers. He eventually concedes, “I knew I wasn’t going to get out from under my name” 
(ibid, p.85), highlighting the difficulty of stepping out from the confines of established 
norms and once again emphasizing the limitations of freedom as suggested by Sen18. 
Ironically the weight of censorship is felt most by those from within his group. Benji 
and his friends all have nicknames for each other which, with the passage of time, 
were near-to-impossible to shrug. “We called them by the old nicknames after all this 
time because it kept them in our clutches no matter how they struggled. They were 
branded by their pasts as much as we were” (ibid, p.20). 
 The labelling comes to reflect more on the pathologies of the group than that 
of the individual to whom the nomenclature is applied and points to a narcissistic drive 
in the act of labelling. This is explicit in the adult narrator’s understanding of their 
friend Marcus being “a key player” (ibid, p.42) in their social hierarchy, for Marcus 
“reassured [them] that there was someone more unfortunate than [them]selves” 
(ibid). Thus Marcus becomes instrumental in everyone’s experiment. Advocating group 
identity for Benji and his friends also becomes indicative of a group held hostage to 
their double consciousness “forcing [them] to say “Fuckin’ rednecks”” (SH, p.82) 
whenever they passed “the truck with the Confederate-flag bumper sticker” (ibidem). 
 The frustration and despair which they experience at having to participate in an 
ongoing experiment stems as much from the perceived confrontation with prejudice 
as it does from the demands of group expectations. “... The long war over what white 
culture was acceptable and what was not” (ibid, p.63) was just one of their many 
battlegrounds. For example, Benji liked to spend money on “music for moping” 
(ibidem), having most of his other music provided for him by his sister’s record 
collection. His sentiments naturally ran along the lines that “Rap was a natural 
resource, might as well pay for sunlight ...” (ibidem). However, his friends do not 
subscribe to his viewpoint perceiving his attitude as a rejection of black culture. As 
                                                          
18
 See my p.27 
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menacing as the truck, the pressure is placed on him to conform. Nonethess, the rules 
were constantly changing: 
 
We redrew the maps feverishly, throwing out our agreements and concessions. 
This week surf wear was in, and we claimed Ocean Pacific T-shirts and Maui shorts 
as our own. Next year, Lacoste was out in enemy territory again, reclaimed by the 
diligent forces of segregation (ibidem). 
 
The incessant demand for re-alignment within Benji’s group does little to 
accommodate individual self assertion as the boys perform to the ad-hoc rules of 
teenage whim. Benji is all too familiar with someone else’s direction surmising that 
“we delivered our lines in the darkness ... until one day you realise you have a fucked-
up haircut and you get a new one ...” (ibid, p.194). So whilst stereotyping or role-
casting is so often perceived as emanating from ‘other’, both Whitehead and Jen 
proffer germane examples of behavioural prescription from the confines of group 
belonging which inevitably diminish the right to self assert. There is an undeniable 
sense, then, in adolescence that lives lived until this pivotal psychosocial 
developmental phase of self-questioning have been enacted to someone else’s 
direction. Whether it be “watching[ing] out for the undertow” (SH, p.55) which 
threatens life’s stability or whether it comes in the form of a father’s signature haircut, 
the conditioning or lack of choice is inherent. 
 Benji’s haircut is truly symbolic of artifice. It represents parental nurture and 
care, “the sound of the long, thin blades sniping against each other was the sound of 
[his father’s] undivided attention” (SH, p.162). And despite the fact that this attention 
was laced with vaporised curses, “when it was done it was perfect” (SH, p.163). Yet 
within a few hours all “tucks and pats and proddings were undone ... the underlying 
principles revealed as counterfeit” (ibidem). 
 Recognising the artifice in living by someone else’s standards, both Benji and 
Mona strive to find that identity within which lies the essence of their respective 
selves. Yet it is only in the freedom found beyond the limits of someone else’s 
experiment that they can discover that to which they want to commit, thereby placing 
‘dibs’ on their choices and claiming selfhood. 
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II.2 Rebellion 
 
 Several characters in Gish Jen’s and Colson Whitehead’s respective novels have 
revealed a desire to break free from the hegemonic roles placed on them from 
without. I have shown how the prescriptive demands of group membership are played 
out in each novel and how the obstacles to Mona’s and Benji’s self assertion have 
proven manifold. Further, I have intimated that to claim selfhood supports both an 
exploration of and experimentation with identities, as well as a commitment to choices 
concomitant with Grotevant’s identity status work. Yet exploration in defiance of a 
prescriptive standard signifies rebellion. 
 In the interest of fairness and by way of keeping the peace amongst brothers, 
Benji and his brother Reggie have been raised with the principles of “even Stephen” 
(SH, p.272) – a principle which advocates pure and simple equality. In this quasi-
unionist relationship choice is fundamental as the brothers vie to stake their claim. – 
“Dibs was all” (ibid, p.5). Yet the freedom to choose which bed to sleep in or which 
chore to do is not always practicable as the brothers’ fifty-fifty reign occasionally gets 
compromised. Incidents such as the pot which, as a result of their mother’s distraction, 
gets left to putrefy, neither Reggie or Benji willing to take responsibility for it, whilst 
amusing both serves to underpin a possible fallacy in the perception of freedom of 
choice, as well as to highlight the primacy of choice. 
 “As a former twin [Benji] liked things separate” (ibid, p. 18) and his desire to 
claim a new identity as Ben has been the start of his attempt at self-assertion. “Your 
style, your vibe, was all you had” (ibid, p.61). Yet, as we have seen, he has floundered 
in social trenches dug by group dominance. Even the music he enjoys is called into 
question. In pointing out to his friends the influences that the German band Kraftwerk 
has had on Afrika Bambaataa’s music, Benji was not expecting to have to face the firing 
squad. He is met with a scornful “I forgot you like that white music” (ibid, p.62). Yet “I 
wasn’t “trying to rag on Afrika” (ibidem), he explains to the reader, “but salute his 
oddball achievement. His paradox”(ibidem). 
 But paradox does not sit well with the status quo as Rabbi Horowitz, in Mona in 
the Promised Land, also discovers. A proponent of free choice and instrumental in 
Mona’s self discovery he gets fired by those intent on making him dance to their tune. 
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“It’s not fair to have had to pay the price for love”, he says, “and yet I’m richer for it. A 
paradox” (MPL, p.268). 
 Having “been signed up for the family project” (MPL, p.100), a project which is 
prescriptive to the nth degree, Mona finds that she is living with a sense of 
helplessness. “Perhaps this is why Mona allied herself with the Jews, with their 
booming belief in doing right, with their calling and their crying out. Justice!” (ibid, 
p.254). She wants to find justice in the mere manner of doing things her way, the 
American way – “I can remember what I want, I can be what I want, I can –“ (ibid, 
p.248). And when Mona awakens to the “self inside the self” (MPL, p.109) in her 
lovemaking scene (see my pp. 21-22), it follows an express act of self assertion. Finding 
“someone sharing her skin” (ibidem), who ‘fits’ without adjustments arises from an 
incident in which she is rendered helpless – a victim. In the dark, struggling with a man 
whose strength emaciates her own, Seth comes to her rescue. But it is in staking claim 
to this event and avenging her attacker, by re-living the experience with Seth that she 
connects with her inner self. In talking “about what the man felt like, and what he did, 
and what she did, and how she felt (MPL, p.110) and in being assertive by saying “stop 
when she wants” (ibidem), she takes control of a helpless situation, throws off the 
deterministic stricture of her learned helplessness, and makes it her experiment. 
  “Where does it comes from, the will to make yourself into something more 
than your endowment? (ibid, p.237) wonders Mona. She has fallen out with her 
mother and run away from home, finding herself “at the pointy start of time. Behind 
her, no history. Before her – everything” (ibid, p.255). And in the same way that she 
staked a claim to her individuality by avenging her attacker, she now leaves home in an 
attempt to forge her own path. 
 
[s]he sees herself in perspective, she feels, quite unexpectedly, as though she 
stands in the Garden of Eden. Just for a moment. The wind of apprehension, as 
always, will blow. But between gusts, she feels it – not even that she is standing 
in, but as though she is herself the Garden of Eden. A place that will remain a 
place of sun even after the poor forked whatever have been banished. She feels 
as though she stands at the pointy start of time. Behind her, no history. Before 
her – everything. ... Mona feels it – something opening within herself, big as the 
train station, streaming with sappy light (ibid, p.255).  
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This is Mona’s awakening, an awakening to herself as a singular being in possession of 
her own identity19. But she is plagued with guilt. She imagines her mother’s cry: “How 
arrogant! As if you have no mother! As if you come out of thin air!” (ibid). Nonetheless, 
in regarding herself without history she can divorce herself from the relational aspect 
of her identity and simply be an intrinsic ‘self’.  SHE IS, with no relational qualifier. SHE 
IS, in the absence of group consenters. For even though she has been reminded time 
and time again that “Chinese people don’t do such things” (MPL, p. 45), she no longer 
worries about her list of ‘nots’ – “not Wasp, and not black, and not as Jewish as Jewish 
can be; and not from China town” (MPL, p.231). Awake to her uniqueness, her 
necessary otherness, she becomes free to choose that which she would be. But to 
what consequence? By the end of Jen’s novel Mona has indeed re-defined herself, but 
has become estranged from her mother. Is this the price she has to pay for freedom? 
 At the close of Sag Harbor Benji pins his hopes on a new start with the 
accompanying expectancy of forging new paths and creating new dreams at the dawn 
of the school year. Not for him a re-tracing of the wornout paths that others have 
trekked. “As if we weren’t jealous of someone who just didn’t give a fuck” (ibid, p. 
270). Yet his path has been marked by the perception of the futility of trying to re-
create a new self. On the night of the power failure at the ice-cream parlour on one of 
Benji’s late night stints, he experiences a sense of powerlessness, similar to Mona’s, as 
he takes stock of life’s injustices. 
 It begins with a sense of guilt at having replaced Gabe’s tuck shop (a place 
where he and his mates previously hung out) with the ice cream parlour as a place to 
“kill a chunk of summer” (ibid, p.130). Scooping away for Everyman he feels revolted 
by the impatience of customers who “juggled condescension and confusion” (ibid, p. 
112) in a bid to keep him in his place. He faces the grim conclusion that “we [are] ... all 
kept by this place in some way” (ibidem), and ruminating in the dark he becomes 
overwhelmed with the disappointment of dashed hopes. He had wanted to hook up 
with Meg, a girl he had taken a fancy to – “There was a moment in the dark when I had 
pictured her giving me a ride home ... and then various things occurring” (ibid, p. 116). 
                                                          
19
 “To say one’s identity is an explicit theory of oneself as a person (original emphasis) is to say it is a 
theory that construes the self as a rational agent. To see oneself as a rational agent, moreover, is to see 
oneself as singular and continuous (Moshman, 2005:87) 
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That was not to be. He ponders his disdain of the manager, Bert, who makes “a good 
show of being upright when Martine was about, but once the boss left he spent half 
the shift in the bathroom, shivering in hangover (ibid, p. 96), and he wryly considers 
NP’s commandeering of free ice cream. Benji makes a choice that night and revolts. He 
revolts against the mere injustice of it all. 
 With the power supply still out the shop closes for the night. Leaving to go their 
separate ways, NP suddenly remembers his mother’s ice-cream which he has left 
inside. As he returns to get it something comes over Benji. He “can’t explain what 
happened” (ibid, p.116) but he “had a fall guy in NP” (ibid, p.117) and so in defiance of 
a hegemonic world at odds with his own desire for assertion he returns to the dark of 
the shop and opens the freezers. 
 
I couldn’t see it, but I pictured the white mist in the darkness spilling out in 
chilly, ghostly tendrils. The heat and humidity reached inside, brushing their 
fingertips along the side of the cans and transforming the frost there into beads 
of water. It was an exchange, the outside coming inside and the inside entering 
outside, like a tiny darkness that grew and then spread to cover whole towns 
(ibidem). 
  
Benji’s act, his choice to destroy the boundaries put in place to separate and contain 
things in their ‘rightful’ places, becomes his cry for assertion. Yet at some level he 
remains cognisant of the fact that his self assertion may wreak consequences on 
others. 
 
From time to time, I think of the freezer and have a vision of the catastrophe. As 
the night grows long, the containers at the bottom of the pile start to buckle 
under their burden. What is inside has gone soft and weak. The bottom cans 
collapse under the weight of their brothers and the ones up high tumble out of 
the freezer, knocking the doors wide, the lids of the cans popping off. The cans 
splash out their guts, one after the other. It’s dark, and no one can see it but me, 
I can see it, the rainbow calamity on the tile, the green mint and bloodred 
sherbet and other assorted plenty in a cookie-clotted sludge oozing out across 
the floor, marshmallows floating like broken teeth, all this in a slow and ugly 
wave, reaching toward me like a hand (ibid, p.119). 
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As Benji walks home that night he gives a metaphorical tip of his hat to his ancestors.  
“For a few minutes I was a true son of Eastville, returning with my brothers in the dark 
down Bay Street and Hempstead Street after a good day’s work” (ibid, p.118). Yet the 
darkness swallows his gesture and the apprehension remains that this occult 
recognition of his forebears cannot appease the critics who uphold insider doctrine. 
For whilst Benji does acknowledge his roots he cannot shake the feeling that “[t]hey 
never changed so there was no need to appraise them, coo over them honour them in 
any way” (ibid, p.19). “We were always coming upon paths made by those who had 
come before us, retracing their discoveries and mistakes” (ibidem). Yet “the slow and 
ugly wave” (SH, p.119) of disapproval advances and engulfs the narrator’s thoughts 
and carries with it fear and desperation; yet also a sense of entitlement and desire for 
assertion. As with the old car that Benji and his friends took delight in destroying, the 
“red Karmann Ghia, that debased victim of the Rust Gods” (SH, p. 128) whose symbolic 
subversive existence satisfied “adolescent aesthetics of destruction” (ibidem) as they 
let rip with their BB guns on its decaying body, the catastrophe at Jonni Waffle 
becomes the outcry of a teenager who is left with no perceivable alternative. He 
cannot take to the street with a watermelon, but he can orchestrate his own revolt. 
 
II.3 Involvement versus Commitment 
 
 In a conversation Mona has in Mona in the Promised Land, she is asked, 
“What’s the difference between a chicken and a pig at breakfast?” (MPL, p.116). The 
answer she is given is that “the chicken is involved but the pig is committed” (ibidem), 
which invites us to take a closer look at this distinction. The fundamental difference 
would appear to be the degree of self that is brought to the table (no pun intended). 
As I pointed out in the first part of this chapter, Mona and Benji find themselves 
‘involved’ in other people’s experiments but to which they are not truly committed. 
What, then, is the staying force of commitment? 
 At the beginning of Sag Harbor, Benji causes himself considerable discomfort by 
committing to a pair of skates that are too small for him. He claims, “I was not the kind 
of person to ask for the right size after I had committed” (SH, p.9). Whilst this incident 
seems trivial, and light-hearted, even typical of adolescent choices, it highlights the 
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degree to which one often does make choices, committing to those choices without 
due consideration, thus unavoidably succumbing to enacting a part in someone else’s 
experiment. This sort of ‘commitment’ which is, for the large part a simple act of 
alignment, is related to Marcia’s model of identity foreclosure to which I have already 
made several references. Dibs have not been claimed and neither has there been a 
phase or process of exploration and experimentation. Benji’s commitment to skates 
which cause pain is moderated by his underlying feelings of inadequacy in the same 
way that Mona eventually recognises her involvement in the Temple Youth Group and 
even her role in Camp Gugelstein as mitigated by her need to belong; true 
commitment being an affirmation of will. 
 Towards the end of Jen’s novel, Seth reveals to Mona how her telephone 
conversations with the newly resurrected Sherman have, in fact, been conversations 
with Seth himself who has been impersonating Sherman. In pleading his case Seth 
argues that whilst his actions were dishonest they showed commitment – “You have to 
at least give me credit for commitment” (ibid, p.279), he argues. “[T]hings aren’t so 
straightforward. Sometimes deception is necessary. Even Nietzsche says that there is 
truth through masks” (ibidem). 
 It is ironic that Seth who has always claimed to have lived by the motto that 
“between the inside person and the outside person there should be no difference” 
(ibid, p.121) finds insight through his use of the ‘Sherman disguise’. Donning this mask 
brings about an encounter with himself; for whilst Seth initially tries to live 
‘authentically’ in his teepee of anti-bourgeois design, the farce of this utopian, self-
serving world is what proves to be inauthentic. It is only in his guise as an ‘authentic 
deep-thinking Sherman’ that he is able to enter Mona’s inner world for the first time 
and make an genuine connection with her, giving credence to his own understanding 
of Nietzsche’s paradox of “truth through masks” (ibid, p.279). It is in wearing 
Sherman’s mask that Seth is able to drop the mask of free-thinking radical and seek 
out Mona, connecting with her openly and in so doing to meet the real Mona, rather 
than the radical Yoko Ono of his fantasies. “All you wanted was for me to be a radical” 
(ibid, p.222) were Mona’s words at their break-up when she realised that “somehow 
her experiment ha[d] turned into his experiment” (ibid, p.223). 
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 Yet equally ironic is that throughout Mona’s identity performance with the 
original Sherman in which the artifice of her performance is exposed by his words “You 
just want to have a boyfriend to become popular” (ibid, p.21), Mona is lead to a greater 
understanding of authenticity and able to reject Seth’s in-authenticity. The real 
Sherman commits to the real Mona, not her performance, and yet eventually rejects 
her performance as farcical. Mona only later recognises the truth in Sherman’s insight 
and, thus, throughout the story tries to re-connect with this Sherman. 
 Commitment concedes choice and demands assertiveness which mere 
involvement does not. Involvement is often revealed as pretence, a key formula in 
identity alignment. The pretence of Benji’s intricate group handshakes in Sag Harbor 
were revealed to be an “unmistakable” (SH, p.66) fraud, yet Seth’s performance comes 
from a place of sincerity and commitment. On this new ground of authenticity, then, 
Mona and Seth can claim themselves and each other. At the end of Jen’s novel, “Mona 
the Uncommitted” (MPL, p.297) finally commits, and Mona the eternal explorer 
reaches identity achievement in accepting the plurality of her being. “She thinks how 
she could really change her name if she wanted to; and she thinks how at one point in 
her life that was what mattered more than anything” (ibid, p.303). In the end, 
however, she finds comfort in acceptance – not acceptance as a means to belong or 
acceptance in a performance – but acceptance of her singular and authentic self. 
 
II.4 Representation and Plural Identities 
 
 In an essay entitled “Performing Identity in Gish Jen’s Mona in the Promised 
Land, Fu Jen Chen claims that there has been a “demise of totalising identification” 
(Chen, 2007:56) in what she calls the “post-modern-global capitalist regime” (ibidem) 
of today. This is similar to what Devereux means when he refers to the individual who 
with a sufficient number of groups to identify becomes equipped with a “tool box” of 
identities (Devereux, 1975). “When an individual has a sufficient number of sufficiently 
varied ... identities, each of them becomes a tool and their totality a kind of ‘tool box’ 
which both actualize and implement socially his unique pattern of personality” 
(ibidem). This is what Mona and Benji are offered, and their identity status work can 
be revealed as complete in the successful merging of these different identities into one 
46 
 
self. At the end of Jen’s novel Mona achieves this metaphorical marriage of identities 
which reaches its symbolic climax in the form of her daughter Io. And, in a sense, so 
does Benji. Whilst in recognition of his life-long hang-ups he claims that “incomplete 
children become incomplete adults” (SH, p.264), the adult Benji can, in the end, stand 
outside that person to claim himself. 
 
Talking about that summer all this time, sometimes I have to stop and say, I 
don’t know who this Benji kid is, either ... The poor sap. I need him to figure out 
how I got where I am, and he needs me to reassure him that despite all he 
knows and has seen and feels, there is more” (ibidem). 
 
 This feeling of otherness in self is something which Werner Sollors points out in 
Mary Antin’s “The Promised Land” (1912). “I was born, I have lived, and I have been 
made over. Is it not time to write my life’s story? I am just as much out of the way as if 
I were dead, for I am absolutely other than the person whose story I have to tell”. 
(Antin apud Sollors, 1986:32). Both the retrospective20 and the fluid act of identity are 
represented here in the concept of evolving selfhood. 
 Fu Jen Chen states that “the new politics of subjectivity celebrates multiple 
shifting identifications and free choice to identify with a proliferation of differences” 
(Chen, 2007:56). Yet, throughout both texts, Jen and Whitehead appear to question 
this freedom of choice. “How can everybody in the fucking world be Jewish?” asks 
Alfred, the black cook in Mona in the Promised Land. 
Historically many are the precursors to the “new politics” to which Chen refers. 
The mere citing of something ‘new’ rests on the understanding that something 
different has gone before. In counterpoise to White Anglo Saxon Protestant America, 
and heralded by the Civil Rights Movement, minority groups share in the ways in which 
the dominant group has perceived them, and have had to fight for their say in the 
nation’s dialogue. With America’s history of racial oppression, the role of artists has 
long been relied upon to give voice to a marginalised group. As early as the Harlem 
Renaissance, W E B Du Bois (1926) was of the opinion that “all art is propaganda and 
ever must be” (Du Bois apud Sollors, 1996:103), and remained adamant that his artistic 
purpose was “for gaining the right of black folk to love and enjoy” (ibidem). In the light 
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 See my p.15 
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of the politics of the day this propagandist feature of art is relevant. Yet in today’s 
post-civil rights age does the burden of representation linger? 
 There are indeed proponents of representation that insist that the historical 
nature of race and ethnicity require a “reading by ethnicity” (Wong apud Japtok, 
p.161). Wong argues that it is “a necessary act of tradition – and identity-building for 
those whose literatures have been rendered invisible by subsumption” (sic) (ibid). 
Likewise, it becomes apparent that there are those who have suffered at the hands of 
prejudice and their ethnic identity thus pervades all other aspects of self. In this regard 
Anne Anlin Cheng speaks of “racial melancholia” which, she states, “denotes a 
condition of endless self-impoverishment” (Cheng, 2001:148), highlighting the often 
“constitutive role that grief plays in racial/ethnic subject formation” (ibid, l.62). Those 
that suffer injury need to empower themselves by “speaking out against that injury” 
(ibid, l.73), she declares. And indeed, those who purport to upstage a culture or take a 
political stance should be allowed to do so. But simple affiliation to the group should 
not make this mandatory. Is not prescriptive representation succumbing to another 
kind of hegemony – that of the sovereignty of group identity? If ‘rum and raisin’ has 
been chosen for the artist before s/he gets to the party, insider doctrine then simply 
takes over the reins of the hegemonic ‘other’. 
 Surely then the key to selfhood lies in both the acceptance and 
acknowledgement of Devereux’s ‘tool box’ of plural identities. Sen argues that we are 
each a composite of multiple identities and that given these plural associations and 
affiliations relative importance must be assigned accordingly in any given context (Sen, 
2006:xiii). It is time to acknowledge this. Chapelle states that “Only through complete 
artistic freedom can any artist discover and present his or her own truth” (Chappelle 
apud Toure 2011:58), for although “artists have a special place in the collective mind of 
the groups that claim them” (ibid), as members of those collectives we need to 
acknowledge the artists’ affiliations to other groups. So where does the tally lie with 
Jen and Whitehead’s views? 
What makes Mona in the Promised Land and Sag Harbor in their broadest 
sense ethnic is that they are “works written by, about, or for persons who perceived 
themselves, or were perceived by others, as members of ethnic groups ...” (Sollors, 
1986:243). Yet warns Sollors, “the categorization of writers as members of ethnic 
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groups ... is partial, temporal, and insufficient characterization at best” (ibid, p.15). In 
revealing the composite factors which have shaped their characters identities, as well 
as the parleying voices that claim representation, Jen and Whitehead understand the 
partiality, temporality and insufficiency of such a limited and limiting view of identity. 
“Assigning names is a technique of conceptual sorting” (Taylor, 2007:630) and, indeed, 
Gish Jen has come to realise that she has to accept that “either you’re categorized or 
else you’re ignored” (Jen, 1993)21. Yet this compartmentalising of the creative flow 
must, nevertheless, jar with what Jen has taken great pains in her novel to resist – the 
singularity of identity22. Jen’s Mona and Callie are singular characters with singular 
histories, as indeed are the other characters in her novel who to some extent could be 
perceived as representative of their respective ethnic groups. But Jen seems to resist 
this notion. – “But he’s not your representative” (MPL, p.220) says Mona of Alfred’s 
role as cook at the pancake house. “He’s your employer” (ibidem).  
Like Mona, Jen appears to be making the same assertion as Mona. Indeed she 
has spoken out against representational service –   "It's particularly the concern of a 
writer [to ask], 'What is my rightful territory? Do I accept limitations placed on me by 
the mainstream? Do I accept my assigned subjects?' The answer is 'I do not.' It’s time 
to think again about ethnic lit. What is it about? What does it presume to speak on? It 
doesn’t need to be representative to be of value” (Jen, 1996)23. 
Nonetheless the issue remains that “[i]n the complicated American landscape 
of regional, religious and ethnic affiliations, it could be very difficult to construct the 
self as an autonomous individual and as fated group member” (original emphasis) 
(Sollors, 1986:173). Yet perhaps it is not as fated group members that  Jen and 
Whitehead wish to assert themselves. They seem to understand Mona’s parents’ 
“make sure” policy (MPL, p.118), which is surely the policy of all insider doctrine. 
 
Make sure, more sure – the endless refrain of her parents’ lives. Sometimes 
Mona wants to say to them, You know, the Chinese revolution was a long time 
                                                          
21
 In an interview with Yuko Matsukawa http://www.questia.com/reader/printPaginator/872 
22
 This is not to be confused with being a singular entity. To be a singular entity is to understand oneself 
as unique whereas the singularity of identity refers to the limited scope of an identity which is defined 
on one singular aspect. 
23 In an interview with Julie Shiroishi  http://asianweek.com/092796/cover.html 
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ago; you can get over it now. Okay, you had to hide in the garden and listen to 
bombs fall out of the sky, also you lost everything you had. And it’s true you 
don’t even know what happened to your sisters and brothers and parents, and 
only wish you could send them some money. But didn’t you make it? Aren’t you 
here in America, watching the sale ads, collecting your rain checks? You know 
what you are now? She wants to say. Now you’re smart shoppers. You can 
forget about make sure. But in another way she understands it’s like asking the 
Jews to get over the Holocaust, or like asking the blacks to get over slavery. 
Once you’ve lost your house and your family and your country, your devil-may-
care is pretty much gone too (ibidem). 
 
Yet now in the twenty-first century, isn’t it time to accept the singularity of personal 
experience? And isn’t it thus possible and necessary to embrace the plurality of the 
individual’s identity associations? We can hold on to our histories without letting them 
hold on to us. 
Various selves can coexist, seems to be Jen’s message. There can be a 
difference “between the inside person and the outside person” (ibid, p.121). Yin and 
yang can cohabitate naturally for, as Seth finally concludes, “without the world of 
outer politeness, you cannot have a world of inner richness” (ibid, p.237). Says Jen, 
 
There’s a very Western view in which somehow you need to resolve the tension 
between any two things, to want things to come to a kind of conclusion ... 
whereas I’ve been wondering where this whole idea of fluidity comes from, and I  
think it’s because I grew up with an [Eastern] idea of yin/yang, sweet/sour. 
Opposites don’t fight each other, but belong together and can intensify each 
other, and are simply in the nature of the world”24 
 
It would seem then that the biggest hindrance to self assertion might be in 
allowing the historical cultural past of modern ethnicities to prescribe current 
attitudes. As Shana Russell states in her paper entitled “The Intellectual Promised 
Land: Negotiating Racial Hypervisibility in the Cultural Studies Classroom” 25, “The 
preferred school of thought as it relates to the examination of blackness, was one of 
suffering” (Russell, p.2). She argues that this is a “recurring message” (ibidem) in Mona 
in the Promised Land and that in Mona’s conversion to Judaism, the notion that there 
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is learning involved in being a minority, “suggests that there is a performance 
associated with being oppressed. That being marginalised is a choice, or a legacy 
bestowed upon a person at birth. It is a source of pride and inspiration” (ibid, p.5). 
Thus she concludes that the prescriptive narrative stems from a “mythologized past” 
(ibidem). 
Michael Fischer suggests that the newer works of American ethnic literature 
promote in a “paradoxical sense” ethnicity as something which is “reinvented and 
reinterpreted in each generation by each individual” (Fischer apud Sollors, 1991:xi). By 
drawing attention to the past’s prescriptive narrative and in using their adolescent 
protagonists to rebel against such prescription, Jen and Whitehead appear to be 
forging new ground. Says Whitehead of Du Boisian double consciousness: 
 
The double consciousness is about being a human being, an individual in society, 
and trying to make your way in a world where you are completely separate but 
wholly a part of it. It applies to every ethnic group, religious group, and on a 
more personal level, how an individual deals with the problem of being in 
society.26 
 
This reinterpretation of traditional messages is something Paul C. Taylor 
examines in his paper entitled “Post-Black, Old Black”. In this work he furthers Chen’s 
“new politics of subjectivity”27, by eulogising the “gains of multiculturalism and the 
consequent lifting of the burdens of racial reductionism” (Taylor, 2007:625). He says 
that “we see this development manifest in the emergence of artists for whom black 
identity [and, I might venture, racial or ethnic identity] is something to be interrogated, 
scrutinized, and variously enacted, if enacted at all ...” (ibid). Not for the purpose of 
denying one’s roots but in so doing to “expan[d] ... the boundaries of the definition” 
(Taylor, 2007:635). 
Mona has expanded these boundaries and, in essence, so has her sister Callie. 
Callie’s decision to embrace her ethnicity holds the weight of free choice and embraces 
ethnicity on her own terms and thus broadens her personal boundaries of definition. 
In choosing her own version of what it means to be Chinese and thus “embracing ... a 
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group identity in voluntary defiance [...it] allows [Callie]  to steer a Roycean middle 
course between ancient narrowness and vulgar monotony” (Sollors, 1986:206). Says 
Sollors, “By creating new, not traditionally anchored group identities and by 
authenticating them, they may represent individuality and American identity at the 
same time” (ibidem). 
Departing from her parents’ code, Callie has edified ethnicity as a consensual 
act, rejecting theirs, and society’s hegemony. Perhaps Callie, the “self-cleaning oven” 
(MPL, p.67) in learning to “raise [her] own hand” (ibid) has also found her Promised 
Land. Whilst Callie’s newfound identity is shown to be not so much about self-
discovery – the unearthing of qualities she did not previously recognise in herself, it is 
fundamentally about choice. “Callie is indeed sick of being Chinese, but there is being 
Chinese and being Chinese” (MPL, p.167). Together with Mona she redefines what it 
means to be Chinese and American. 
Despite their parents’ acceptance that the girls would need to find redefinition, 
Mona has to remind them of this, thus revealing the resistance of others when it 
comes to individual self-assertion. Their cry is joint: 
 
You are the one who brought us up to speak English. You said you would bend 
like bamboo instead of acting like you were planted by Bell Telephone. You said 
we weren’t pure Chinese anymore, the parents had to accept we would be 
something else (MPL, p.49). 
 
In depicting two contrasting sisters with diverse paths, Jen’s message appears to be 
one which celebrates individual uniqueness and in the figure of their mother, Helen, 
Jen seems to reveal her underlying desire for mother America to become equally 
accepting of it. At the novel’s end, Mona considers marrying her plural selves by 
claiming ownership of the name Changowitz. But whilst she can attest to her 
uniqueness in this way, true freedom from prescriptive performance is not really hers 
to grasp. This can only be granted her by her mother’s change of heart. In the same 
way, Jen seems to be asking America for a change of heart. 
 And in a similar way, Whitehead’s story is about more than just a young black 
boy whose minority ethnic status challenges his will to assert. Benji is a young boy 
whose personal home life has meted out unique and singular challenges, and so how 
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can either Mona or Benji be understood without the acknowledgement of their 
individual and personal histories? 
 Both Jen and Whitehead seem to understand that “Identity presupposes the 
differentiation and maintenance of differences as much as the synthesis or integration 
of the different” (Straub, 2001:66), but can their audiences? 
In an interview with Yuko Matsukawa, to which I have already made 
reference28, Jen declares “I was damned if I was going to give them [my readers] the 
exotic nonsense they thought they wanted” (Jen, 1993). So whilst the racially 
prescriptive family drink for the Changs might indeed be ginseng “what they really 
want is a milkshake” (MPL, p.3), and this is what Jen delivers. Through the depiction of 
Mona’s staged and fabricated oriental identity, Jen skews any preconceptions of 
Chinese or Oriental ethnicity, and indeed of American identity, that the reader might 
bring to the table. 
Benji and his friends “always fought for real” (SH, p.158), and it might be 
suggested that Colson Whitehead has armed himself with the weapons of his trade in 
his fight to assert his unique self. He is reported to have brought “a fresh, original 
sensibility to American letters” (Selzer, 2008), with his work cutting across culture, 
genre and media. In what might appear a complete disregard for the eclectic nature of 
his work, it too has been categorized as African American Literature, perhaps 
appearing in this canon in much the same way as the firefly that got its name – 
 
from its fake time, people time, when in fact most of its business went on when 
people couldn’t see it. Its true life was invisible to us but we called it firefly after 
its fractions. Knowable and fixed for a few seconds, sharing a short segment of 
its message before it continued on its real mission, unknowable in its true self 
and course, outside of reach. It was a bad name because it was incomplete – 
both parts were true, the bright and the dark, the one we could see and the 
other one we couldn’t. It was both (SH, p.153) 
 
 Says Jefferson, “[w]e may consider each generation as a distinct nation 
with a right to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding generation, 
more than the inhabitants of another country” (Jefferson apud Sollors, 1986: 
209). Whilst Whitehead strives to impress on his craft an autonomous 
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individuality by questioning “the power of ethnicity” (ibid, p.257) he is “helping 
to create it anew” (ibidem), thus skewing our definition of African American 
Literature. 
 
* * * * * * * 
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Conclusion 
 
 As mentioned in my introduction, the bildungsroman is the perfect forum for 
an author to investigate the growing sense of self in the maturing individual. In my first 
chapter I looked at the various issues which have shaped this development by first 
addressing the ethnicity of Jen and Whitehead’s protagonist’s. In Growing Up Ethnic: 
Nationalism and the Bildungsroman in African American and Jewish American Fiction, 
Martin Japtok explains his key interest in this dual relationship of adolescence and 
ethnicity. He says: 
 
I have selected texts that tell coming-of-age stories because in such texts, the 
protagonist’s growing awareness of his/her ethnicity and its social significance, 
as reflected in the text, can reveal much about the shape and importance a work 
gives ethnicity because it focuses on the relations of a protagonist with the 
wider environment. (Japtok, 2005:21) 
 
Whilst Whitehead is wont to classify Sag Harbor as a bildungsroman, his novel does to 
some extent “follow the development of the hero ..., through a troubled quest for 
identity” (Baldick, 2008:35). And so does Jen’s Mona in the Promised Land. The 
ethnicity of Jen and Whitehead’s main characters plays an important role in this 
journey, but it has not been the only driving force in their identity status work. Thus 
whilst the “protagonist-centred writing [may] serve as a communication for ethnic 
writers: on the one hand, [] shar[ing] experiences with other members of the writer’s 
ethnic community; on the other hand, [] communicat[ing] “authentic” views of ethnic 
life to mainstream readers” (Japtok, 2005:25), I have not wanted my interpretation of 
these works to become clouded by the limitation of reading the work as ethnic. 
Indeed, as Horace Kallen points out, “each man in the human family [has] the right to 
give his life ideal expression” (Kallen apud Sollors, 1986:182), for it is through this ideal 
expression that we assert a notion of self. 
 However, asked to defend “the ability of words adequately to represent 
identity or experience” (2008:398) Whitehead29  himself claims that “[t]he situation is 
always hopeless” (ibidem). Nonetheless, the words and language of these novels are 
the recourse to which both Whitehead and Jen apply in an attempt to claim authorial 
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assertion. Indeed, it could be said that Jen and Whitehead have used these novels, 
representative of ethnic genre to “serve as counterweights to the stereotypical view of 
ethnicity by the dominant culture” (Japtok, 2005:24). Yet I believe that they also serve 
as a message to the stereotypical view of representation by their ethnic counterparts. 
In Jen’s opening sentence, her narrator acknowledges stereotype, “There they 
are, nice Chinese family” (MPL, p.3), and panders to the reader’s expectations of an 
immigrant story by leading the reader into a false sense of understanding of the 
essence of the tale – “father, mother, two born-here girls” (ibidem). Standing from a 
position in time where history has played out, the narrator calls the Changs the “New 
Jews” (ibidem) and a “model minority” (ibidem) playing with the reader’s 
understanding of these labels, whilst at the same time offering a flippant ‘nod’ to 
America’s pioneering tradition, “Westward ho! And all that” (MPL, p.4), both 
suggesting that this is a story of settlement whilst aligning the Changs with a great 
American tradition. However, using an irreverent style we have witnessed her dissect 
these notions, tackling issues of assimilation, belonging and identity assertion in the 
face of inevitable stereotyping. Jen’s authorial comment, by Japtok’s suggestion, 
appears to be one of open critique yet with a certain voice of derision which is 
targeted at all stereotyping. Whitehead, too, offers this mockery beginning his tale on 
a sarcastic note – “Asking [when did you get out] was showing off, even though anyone 
you could brag to had received the same gift and had come by it the same way you 
did” (ibid, p.1). 
Whilst Mona in Mona in the Promised Land is fictional and not a bygone Jen 
nor, indeed, Benji in Sag Harbor a pre-ordained Whitehead, their stories expose an 
understanding of identity which seems to advocate the exploration of “otherness in 
ourselves” (Sollors, 1986:31). At the close of Whitehead’s tale, the narrator remarks in 
a way reminiscent of Mary Antin30, “I don’t know who this Benji kid is” (SH, p. 264). Jen 
(1993) affirms that “Mona is the person I would have liked to have been”31 and in so 
doing advocates her author/character connection. 
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Yet is it even necessary to look for this link? “Mona Chang is not 
representative”, says Jen “and we’re finally at the point where people don’t need to be 
representative anymore ... enough of that”32. 
 “We should just call it all “writing” and be done with labels”33, states 
Whitehead. Yet both he and Jen seem to remain skewered to their respective 
representational literary canons. This should not be seen as a failure in their self-
assertiveness, but perhaps a failure in us to concede their freedom of choice. Says 
Whitehead of using language as empowering, “I am a writer, so that’s one of the 
foundational premises of my job. By finding the right words, I master my world ...”34. 
 In his semantic history of identity, Philip Gleason (1983) takes the reader back 
to the origins of the concept of identity; calls to mind the varied stances that 
proponents of different theories (psychological or sociological) take; and ultimately 
urges cultural historians to re-visit these approaches in order to develop the necessary 
critical approach in both the study and the assessment of cultural works. This is what I 
have tried to achieve in this work. By returning to the fundamentals of identity in both 
their individual and collective forms, by revealing the determinacy of historical 
readings and Jen and Whitehead’s resistance to such hegemony, I have hopefully 
skewed the notion of identity as a clearly defined concept. For if artists are to be truly 
cosmopolitan and their works to remain relevant, their “obligations [...] stretch beyond 
to whom [they] are related by the ties of kith and kind, or even the more formal ties of 
a shared citizenship” (Appiah, 2007:xv). Yet in placing “obligations” on them and 
demanding representation, the value of their personal truth is not to be undermined. I 
believe that the abolishment of reductionist thinking lends this worth, revealing “the 
value not just of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking in the 
practices and beliefs that lend them significance” (ibidem). 
 Fundamentally, the degree to which the individual skewers him/herself to an 
identity whether it be to that of an ethnic identity or, indeed, any other identity needs 
to be recognised as choice. Perhaps it is we who need to listen more closely to what 
our artists are saying. As Helen, in Jen’s closing scene, confers on Mona the acceptance 
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of her uniqueness, perhaps it becomes incumbent of us to accept our artists in their 
singular pluralities. 
 “It’s a simple thing to keep the two Greedos together in your head if you know 
how” (SH, p.157). 
 
* * * * * * * 
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